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Abstract. Probability logic has contributed to significant developments in belief types
for game-theoretical economics. We present a new probability logic for Harsanyi Type
spaces, show its completeness, and prove both a denesting property and a unique extension
theorem. We then prove that multi-agent interactive epistemology has greater complexity
than its single-agent counterpart by showing that if the probability indices of the belief
language are restricted to a finite set of rationals and there are finitely many propositional
letters, then the canonical space for probabilistic beliefs with one agent is finite while the
canonical one with at least two agents has the cardinality of the continuum. Finally, we
generalize the three notions of definability in multimodal logics to logics of probabilistic
belief and knowledge, namely implicit definability, reducibility, and explicit definability.
We find that S5-knowledge can be implicitly defined by probabilistic belief but not reduced
to it and hence is not explicitly definable by probabilistic belief.
1. Introduction
Probability logic plays an important role in computer science [27, 7, 33, 9, 24, 31, 22],
artificial intelligence [13, 11, 10, 36] and economics [3, 19]. Game theoretical economics and
multi-agent systems in artificial intelligence motivate our logical exploration of Harsanyi
type spaces. In the context of Harsanyi type spaces, the introspection condition in the
multi-agent setting of game theory states that each agent is certain (in the sense of belief
with probability 1) of his degree of belief at every state. In this paper, we develop a logical
theory of knowledge and belief for multi-agent systems in Harsanyi type spaces by applying
techniques from probability logic [38, 39, 40, 41].
Here we are concerned only about probabilistic beliefs such as the statement “I believe
that the chance of rain today is at least ninety percent.” This belief is about another
statement that it will rain today. Mathematically, statements are modeled as events. Since
the first statement involves probabilities, it is natural to consider these statements in the
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context of a measurable space S = 〈Ω,A〉 where Ω is a state space and A is a σ-algebra
on this space. So we interpret this quantified belief using an operator B≥0.9 on A, i.e. a
mapping from A to A. If A stands for the event that it will rain today, then B≥0.9A denotes
the belief that the chance of rain today is at least ninety percent. For any index r ∈ Q∩[0, 1]
where Q is the set of rationals, we define the operator B≥r similarly. For such a family of
belief operators (also called probability operators) B≥r, one can easily check that such a
family of belief operators satisfies the following properties [34]: for events A,An ∈ A,
B≥0(A) = Ω(1.1)
B≥1(Ω) = Ω(1.2)
B≥rA ⊆ ∼ B≥s(∼ A), r + s > 1(1.3)
rn ↑ r ⇒ B
≥rnA ↓ B≥rA(1.4)
B≥r(A ∩B) ∩B≥s(A ∩ (∼ B)) ⊆ B≥r+sA(1.5)
∼ B≥r(A ∩B)∩ ∼ B≥s(A ∩ (∼ B)) ⊆ ∼ B≥r+sA(1.6)
An ↓ A ⇒ B
≥rAn ↓ B
≥rA(1.7)
where ↑ (↓) means infinitely approaching by an (a) increasing (decreasing) sequence and
∼ means set-complement. The first three properties say that degrees of beliefs are always
between 0 and 1. Properties (1.5) and (1.6) state that belief operators are finitely additive.
Property (1.7) is the continuity from above property from measure theory. These three
properties (1.5)-(1.7) ensure that belief operators are σ-additive. Property (1.4) states
that these operators are continuous in degrees (indices r in B≥r). This kind of treatment
of belief interpreted by operators is analogous to the treatment of knowledge in Kripke
structures, interpreted by partition-induced operators. As in the “possible-world” semantics
for knowledge, we need a quantified version of “Kripke structures” for probabilistic beliefs.
Such quantified Kripke structures, or belief types, play a major role in game-theoretical
economic theory.
There are two approaches to belief types of a multi-agent setup in game theory. The
first represents beliefs explicitly and is called explicit description of beliefs [30, 18]. Such a
description starts with a space of states of nature, which specifies parameters of a game, e.g.
payoff functions. Next it specifies the beliefs of the agents about the space of states of nature,
and then the beliefs about the combination of the nature space with the beliefs about the
nature space and so on. An explicit belief type consists of a hierarchy of beliefs which satisfy
the coherence requirement that different levels of beliefs of every agent do not contradict one
another. In the first layer, beliefs are represented by probability measures over the nature
space, and beliefs in the second layer are represented by probability measures over the space
of probability measures in the first layer, and so on. Such a straightforward description
provides all possible belief types, which form an explicit model for beliefs. However, this
model is hardly a workable model considering the complexity of the representations of the
belief types in it.
The second approach describes beliefs implicitly, what we use for giving formal seman-
tics for beliefs in this paper. This approach was introduced by Harsanyi in 1960’s [16] for
games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players. The corresponding descrip-
tion is defined in a measurable space S = 〈Ω,A〉. For each agent i, we associate each state
of this space with a state of nature and a probability measure on the space. The agent’s
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implicit belief type at the state is this probability measure, which provides a belief over the
nature space. Since each state is associated with a belief type, the probability measure also
defines beliefs of beliefs about the nature space, and so on. So we can extract a hierarchy
of beliefs (or simply an explicit description) from this implicit description. If we ignore
the association with the nature space, namely the economic content, the above association
Ti of states to probability measures is called a type function from Ω to the measure space
∆(S) of probability measures on S. We call the triplet 〈Ω,A, Ti〉 a type space. Samet[34]
demonstrated a natural one-to-one correspondence between such defined type spaces and
the families above of belief operators for every agent. Type spaces provide exactly the
expected “quantified Kripke structures” for beliefs.
Within the multi-agent setting of game theory, a special kind of type spaces called
Harsanyi type spaces are used to describe introspection of agents. In a Harsanyi type space,
each agent is certain of his degree of belief at every state of this space. In this paper, we
take Aumann’s approach to investigate properties about Harsanyi type spaces.
Aumann gave a syntactic approach to beliefs [2], which is an alternative to the above
semantic approach. The building blocks of his syntactic formalism are formulas, which
are constructed from propositional letters (which are interpreted by Aumann as “natural
occurrences”, in contrast with the nature space in Harsanyi type spaces) by the Boolean
connectives and a family of belief operators Lir where r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], where Q is the set of
rational numbers. The characteristic feature of the syntax is this family of operators. We
interpret Lirφ as the statement the agent i’s belief in the event φ is at least r. L
i
r is the
syntactic counterpart for the agent i of the semantic belief operator B≥r on σ-algebras. We
also use a derived modality M ir which means “at most” in our semantics and is defined as
M irφ := L
i
1−r¬φ. In this paper, when we focus on reasoning about beliefs of one agent or
on reasoning about probabilities without the multi-agent setting, we omit the label i for
simplicity.
We give a complete axiomatization of probability logic in the above language for
Harsanyi type spaces. This system is based on our work in [38] about the deductive system
Σ+ for the general type spaces. The most important principle of our axiomatization Σ+ is
an infinitary Archimedean rule:
(ARCH) :
γ → Lsφ(s < r)
γ → Lrφ
.
It reveals that such a simple rule corresponds exactly to the property (1.4) and characterizes
reasoning about probabilities. Except where indicated otherwise, completeness in this paper
refers to weak completeness. That is, if a formula φ is valid, then it is provable.
The system ΣH for Harsanyi type spaces is the basic probability logic Σ+ plus the
following two axiom schema:
• (4p) : Lrφ→ L1Lrφ;
• (5p) : ¬Lrφ→ L1¬Lrφ
which capture the introspection condition in the multi-agent setting that each agent is
certain of his degree of beliefs at every state.
Using the above deductive machinery for Harsanyi type spaces, we demonstrate the
relative complexity of the multi-agent interactive epistemology compared with the one-
agent epistemology from the perspective of probabilistic beliefs. In order to generalize
different results about knowledge in interactive epistemology to the probabilistic setting, in
the following sections we restrict the probability indices in our language for type spaces to a
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finite set of rationals and the propositional letters to a finite set. With respect to knowledge,
Aumann [1] showed that, when there are at least two agents and only one propositional
letter, the canonical state space for knowledge has the cardinality of the continuum while,
for a single agent, the cardinality of the canonical space is finite. Hart, Heifetz and Samet
proved the same proposition in [17] by exhibiting a continuum of different consistent lists
which are constructed through a new knowledge operator called “knowing whether.” In this
paper, we obtain a similar result for probabilistic beliefs by showing that, when there are at
least 2 agents, the canonical state space for probabilistic beliefs has the cardinality of the
continuum while, when there is a single agent, the cardinality of the canonical space is finite.
The first part is proved by adapting a counterexample in [17] through a measure-theoretical
argument. A straightforward proof idea is that, if the knowledge operators used in [17] are
replaced by certainty operators (belief operators with probability 1), then the proof in [17]
goes through. Note that the axiomatization for reasoning about certainty is the logic KD45
[13], which is different from the logic S5 for knowledge. We show that this is true and obtain
a much stronger result that the proof in [17] goes through iff the degrees of belief operators
are strictly bigger than 12 . The second part is shown by demonstrating both a denesting
property and a unique extension theorem that a certain kind of formulas are equivalent
to formulas of depth ≤ 1 and each maximally consistent set of formulas in the above
restricted finite language has only one maximal consistent extension in this finite language
extended by increasing the depth by 1. Our denesting property and unique extension
theorem demonstrate an important property about the probability logic ΣH for Harsanyi
type spaces, which is parallel to but weaker than the well-known denesting property in S5
that any formula in S5 is equivalent to a formula of depth 1. Note that even probability logic
with probability indices in a finite set of rationals is essentially different from qualitative
reasoning such as multi-modal logics. For example, this restricted probability logic does
not have compactness [39] while most modal logics do. So our techniques in the above two
parts differ from those in [17, 1] for knowledge.
Knowledge is closely related to probabilistic belief in interactive epistemology [2, 10].
In this paper we investigate the relationship between these two concepts in the context of
the logic ΣHK := (ΣH +(S5)K + {H1,H2,H3}) where (S5)K denotes the S5-axiomatization
for the knowledge operator K, and
• (H1) : Lrφ→ KLrφ;
• (H2) : ¬Lrφ→ K¬Lrφ;
• (H3) : Kφ→ L1φ.
Intuitively H1 combined with H2 says that the agent knows the probabilities by which
he believes events; (H3) says that if he knows something, then he is certain of it (in the
sense of belief with probability 1). It is well-known in interactive epistemology [2, 3] that,
although the concept of knowledge is implicit in probabilistic beliefs in the above semantic
framework, syntactically it is a separate and exogenous notion which is non-redundant.
Indeed, the probability syntax can only express beliefs of the agents, not that an agent
knows anything about another one for sure. In this paper, we give a logical characterization
of this relationship between probabilistic belief and knowledge by generalizing the three
notions of definability in multi-modal logics [15, 14] to the setting of probabilistic beliefs
and knowledge to show that this relationship is equivalent to the statement that semantically
ΣHK determines knowledge uniquely while syntactically there is no formula DK in ΣHK of
the form Kp ↔ δ, where δ is a formula that does not contain any knowledge operator. In
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other words, this relationship can also be expressed in terms of definability in multimodal
logic that knowledge is implicitly defined by probabilistic belief, but is not reducible to it and
hence is not explicitly definable in terms of probabilistic belief.
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a logical theory of knowledge and belief
for multi-agent systems in a probabilistic setting by applying techniques from probability
logic. Our main contributions are as follows:
(1) We present an axiomatization ΣH for the class of Harsanyi type spaces, which is different
from those in the literature in our infinitary Archimedean rule (ARCH), and we employ
a probabilistic filtration method to show its completeness. By using the same method,
we show in a restricted finite language with only finitely many probability indices both
a denesting property and a unique extension theorem for ΣH , which is a probabilistic
version of the denesting property for S5.
(2) We introduce a type of belief operators called “strongly believing whether”, which are a
generalization of “knowing whether” operator [17], and exhibit a continuum of different
consistent lists of beliefs of two agents which are constructed through these “strongly
believing whether” operators; with the above unique extension theorem for ΣH , we
demonstrate the relative complexity of multi-agent interactive epistemology from the
perspective of probabilistic beliefs.
(3) We provide a logical characterization of the relationship between knowledge and prob-
abilistic beliefs by generalizing the three notions of definability in multimodal logic to
logics of probabilistic beliefs and knowledge.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the syntax and
semantics of probability logics and the completeness of the basic probability logic Σ+. In
Section 3, we show the completeness of the system ΣH with respect to the class of Harsanyi
type spaces and obtain some basic properties about ΣH . Moreover, we use the above
semantic framework and deductive machinery to compute and compare the cardinalities
of the canonical state spaces with only one agent and with many agents, respectively. In
Section 4, we generalize the three notions of definability: implicit definability, reducibility
and explicit definability in multimodal logic to the setting of the logic ΣHK of probabilistic
beliefs and knowledge, and show that knowledge is implicitly defined in ΣHK but is not
reducible to probabilistic belief and hence is not explicitly definable in ΣHK . The paper
concludes with some further open problems about the relationship between knowledge and
belief in Aumann’s knowledge-belief systems.
2. Basic Probability Logic Σ+
In this section, we briefly review the syntax and semantics for probability logics, and the
completeness of the basic probability logic Σ+ [19, 10, 38].
2.1. Syntax and Semantics. The syntax of our logic is very similar to that of modal
logic. We start with a fixed countably infinite set AP := {p1, p2, · · · } of propositional
letters. We also use p, q, · · · to denote propositional letters. The set of formulas φ is built
from propositional letters as usual by connectives ¬, ∧ and a countably infinite modalities
Lr for each r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], where Q is the set of rational numbers. Equivalently, a formula
φ is formed by the following syntax:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Lrφ (r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1])
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Lr is the primitive modality in our language. But we also use a derived modality Mr
which means “at most” in our semantics through the following definition:
(DEF M) Mrφ := L1−r¬φ.
Let L be the formal language consisting of the above components. We use r, s, α, β, · · ·
(also with subscripts) to denote rationals. Next we describe the semantics of our system. A
probability model is a tuple
M := 〈Ω,A, T, v〉
where
• Ω is a non-empty set, which is called the universe or the carrier set of M ;
• A is a σ-field (or σ-algebra) of subsets of Ω;
• T is a measurable mapping from Ω to the space ∆(Ω,A) of probability measures on Ω,
which is endowed with the σ-field generated by the sets:
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω,A) : µ(E) ≥ r} for all E ∈ A and rational r ∈ [0, 1],
• v is a mapping from AP to A, i.e. v(p) ∈ A.
〈Ω,A, T 〉 is called a type space, and T is called a type function on the space.
Remark 2.1. Let T be a type function. Define k(w,A) := T (w)(A) for any w ∈ Ω and
A ∈ A. It is easy to check that k is a Markovian kernel, i.e., it satisfies the following two
conditions:
(1) k(w, ·) is a probability measure on the σ-algebra A for any w ∈ Ω;
(2) k(·, A) is an A-measurable function for any A ∈ A.
Conversely, if k is a Markovian kernel on (Ω,A), then every function T : Ω→ ∆(Ω,A)
such that T (s)(A) := k(s,A) for all s ∈ Ω and A ∈ A is a type function [37].
Since T can be regarded as a Markovian kernel, we sometimes also write T (w)(A) as
T (w,A).
Lemma 2.2. Assume that
• 〈Ω,A〉 is a measurable space, A0 is an algebra on Ω and A0 generates A;
• T : Ω × A → [0, 1] is a function satisfying the condition: for any w ∈ Ω, T (w, ·) is a
probability measure.
Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) For any r ∈ [0, 1] and E ∈ A0, B
≥r(E) := {w : T (w,E) ≥ r} ∈ A;
(2) For any r ∈ [0, 1] and E ∈ A, B≥r(E) := {w : T (w,E) ≥ r} ∈ A
The proof of this lemma is relegated to the Appendix.
For a fixed modelM , there exists a unique satisfaction relation |= between the state w of
M and formulas φ that satisfies the following clauses; moreover, the associated interpretation
[[φ]] = {w ∈M :M,w |= φ} is a measurable set for all formulas φ:
• M,w |= p iff w ∈ v(p) for propositional letters p;
• M,w |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff M,w |= φ1 and M,w |= φ2;
• M,w |= ¬φ iff M,w 6|= φ;
• M,w |= Lrφ iff T (w)([[φ]]) ≥ r, where [[φ]] := {w ∈ Ω :M,w |= φ}.
A formula φ is valid in the probability model M if M |= φ, i.e., for all states w ∈ M ,
M,w |= φ. φ is valid in a class of probability models C if, for each M ∈ C, M |= φ. φ is
valid in a class T of type spaces if φ is valid in all the probability models defined on T .
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2.2. Completeness. In this section, we give an axiomatization of the basic probability
logic which is complete with respect to the class of type spaces and briefly review the proof
of its completeness [37, 38]. Our following proof of the completeness of probability logic for
Harsanyi type spaces is based on this basic one. Without further notice, all the probability
indices such as r, s, t in this paper are assumed to be between 0 and 1.
Probability Logic Σ+
• (A0) propositional calculus
• (A1) L0φ
• (A2) Lr⊤
• (A3) Lr(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ Lt(φ ∧ ¬ψ)→ Lr+tφ, for r + t ≤ 1
• (A4) ¬Lr(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬Ls(φ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬Lr+sφ, for r + s ≤ 1
• (A5) Lrφ→ ¬Ls¬φ, for r + s > 1
• (DIS) If ⊢ φ↔ ψ,⊢ Lrφ↔ Lrψ.
• (ARCH): If ⊢ γ → Lsφ for all s < r, then ⊢ γ → Lrφ.
A logic Λ in L is a set of formulas in L that contains all propositional tautologies, and is
closed under modus ponens and uniform substitution (that is, if φ belongs to Λ, then so do
all of its substitution instances). For a formula φ, ⊢Λ φ denotes φ ∈ Λ. When the context
is clear, we omit the subscript Λ. Probability logic Σ+ is the smallest logic that contains
(A1-A5), and is closed under (DIS) and (ARCH). Observe that the rule (ARCH) is the
only rule that is really about the indices of the modalities. Since the index set Q ∩ [0, 1]
has the Archimedean property, i.e., the property of having no infinitely small elements, our
following logics are outside nonstandard analysis and the fact that the rule has infinitely
many premises seems unavoidable.
Definition 2.3. A finite set Θ = {φ1, · · · , φk} of formulas is inconsistent in a logic Λ (or
Λ-inconsistent) if
∧k
i=1 φi → ⊥ ∈ Λ, and is consistent in Λ (or Λ-consistent) otherwise. A
(finite or infinite) set Ξ of formulas is consistent in Λ if each finite subset of Ξ is consistent
in Λ. Ξ is maximal consistent in Λ if it is consistent in Λ and any set of formulas properly
containing Ξ is not. Σ+ is (weakly) complete with respect to the class of type spaces if any
Σ+-consistent formula is satisfiable in a probability model.
In the following sections, without further notice, we will omit the logic Λ in Λ-consistency
or Λ-inconsistency. The context will determine which logic we mean. Note that consistency
in the above definition is usually called finite consistency in probability logic. Actually, in
probability logic, finite consistency is different from consistency [12, 39]. But, since we won’t
discuss anything related to consistency in probability logic, there is no need to distinguish
between these two notions. For simplicity, we call finite consistency in probability logic
consistency as in the above definition.
Lemma 2.4. (Lindenbaum Lemma)
If Ξ is a consistent set of formulas, then there is a maximal consistent Ξ′ such that
Ξ ⊆ Ξ′.
Proof. Since our definition of consistency is the same as that of consistency in modal logic
[5], so is the proof of the Lindenbaum Lemma. The crucial step is the fact that for any Ξ
and φ, if Ξ is consistent, then one of Ξ ∪ {φ} and Ξ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent. For details, the
reader may refer to Lemma 4.17 in [5].
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Before we present the completeness, we will present some basic theorems of Σ+ which
we will need in the following sections. The reader can also read Section 3 in [19], Section 3
in [38] and Chapter 2 in [37] for detailed proofs.
Proposition 2.5. The following two principles are provable in Σ+:
(1) ¬Lr⊥ if r > 0;
(2) ¬Mr⊤ if r < 1, which is just dual to the first part.
Proposition 2.6. The following principles are provable in Σ+:
(1) If φ→ ψ, then Lrφ→ Lrψ;
(2) Lrφ→ Lsφ if r ≥ s;
(3) ¬Lrφ→Mrφ;
Proposition 2.7. The following principles follow immediately from the above theorem:
(1) If φ→ ψ, then Mrψ →Mrφ;
(2) Mrφ→Msφ if r ≤ s;
(3) ¬Mrφ→ Lrφ;
Proposition 2.8. The following principles hold:
(1) If ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), then ⊢ Lrφ ∧ Lsψ → Lr+s(φ ∨ ψ), for r + s ≤ 1;
(2) If ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), then ⊢ ¬Lrφ ∧ ¬Lsψ → ¬Lr+s(φ ∨ ψ), for r + s ≤ 1.
(3) If ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), then ⊢Mrφ ∧Msψ →Mr+s(φ ∨ ψ), for r + s ≤ 1;
(4) If ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), then ⊢ ¬Mrφ ∧ ¬Msψ → ¬Mr+s(φ ∨ ψ), for r + s ≤ 1.
Corollary 2.9. (1) ⊢ L1φ ∧ Lrψ → Lr(φ ∧ ψ), ⊢ L1φ ∧ ¬Lrψ → ¬Lr(φ ∧ ψ);
(2) ⊢ L1φ ∧Mrψ →Mr(φ ∧ ψ), ⊢ L1φ ∧ ¬Mrψ → ¬Mr(φ ∧ ψ);
(3) ⊢M0φ ∧Mrψ →Mr(φ ∨ ψ), ⊢M0φ ∧ ¬Mrψ → ¬Mr(φ ∨ ψ);
(4) ⊢M0φ ∧ Lrψ → Lr(φ ∨ ψ), ⊢M0φ ∧ ¬Lrψ → ¬Lr(φ ∨ ψ).
Proof. Here we choose Case 3 as an illustration:
M0φ ∧Mrψ → M0(φ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧Mrψ (Proposition 2.7)
→ Mr(φ ∨ ψ) (Proposition 2.8)
Definition 2.10. The depth dp(φ) of a formula φ is defined inductively:
• dp(p) := 0 for propositional letters p;
• dp(¬φ) := dp(φ);
• dp(φ1 ∧ φ2) := max{dp(φ1), dp(φ2)};
• dp(Lrφ) := dp(φ) + 1.
Now we define a local language L(q, d, P ) to be the largest set of formulas satisfying
the following conditions:
• The propositional letters in L(q, d, P ) are those occurring in P ;
• The indices of formulas in L(q, d, P ) are multiples of 1/q;
• The formulas in L(q, d, P ) are of depth ≤ d;
• Logical equivalent formulas are identified.
The above q is called the accuracy of the language L(q, d, P ) (q ∈ N). In particular,
L[ψ] is defined as L(qψ, dψ , Pψ) where Pψ is the set of all propositional letters in ψ, qψ is
the accuracy of ψ (the least common multiple of all denominators of the indices appearing
in ψ) and dψ the depth of ψ. I[ψ] is the finite set of all rationals in the form of p/q ∈ [0, 1]
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where q is the accuracy of ψ; and it is called the index set of the language L[ψ]. Note that
L[ψ] is finite. In general, let L(q, d, P ) be the set of formulas containing only propositional
letters in P having accuracy q and depth at most d modulo logical equivalence. From
propositional reasoning, we know that each formula in L(q, d, P ) is logically equivalent to
a finite disjunction consisting only of non-equivalent disjuncts, each of the disjuncts being
a conjunction consisting only of non-equivalent conjuncts, each conjunct being either itself
in L(q, d − 1, P ) or being obtainable from some formula in L(q, d − 1, P ) by prefixing it
either with a modality Lr or ¬Lr where r is a multiple of 1/q. By induction on the depth
d, we can show that L(q, d, P ) is finite and hence L[ψ] is finite. In the following, we won’t
distinguish between the equivalence classes in L(q, d, P ) and their representatives.
Assume that the set of propositional letters in the language L is implicitly enumer-
ated as: p1, p2, · · · . If P consists of the first w propositional letters in the enumeration,
then L(q, d, P ) is also denoted as L(q, d, w) and Ω(q, d, w) denotes the set of all maximally
consistent sets of formulas in L(q, d, w). Each element in Ω(q, d, w) is also called an atom.
For any maximal consistent set Ξ in the finite local language L′ with accuracy q′ (and
the index set I ′) and depth d′(≥ 1), and for any formula φ of depth ≤ d′−1 in L′, we define:
αΞφ = max{r ∈ I
′ : Lrφ ∈ Ξ} and β
Ξ
φ = min{r ∈ I
′ :Mrφ ∈ Ξ}.
Lemma 2.11. For the above defined αΞφ and β
Ξ
φ , either α
Ξ
φ = β
Ξ
φ or β
Ξ
φ = α
Ξ
φ + 1/q
′.
Fix a formula ψ. Let us denote by Ω[ψ] the set of all maximally consistent sets of
formulas in L[ψ]. This will be the carrier set of our following canonical model. Since
Ω[ψ] ⊆ 2L[ψ] and L[ψ] is finite, so is Ω[ψ]. For any formula φ ∈ L[ψ], define [φ] := {Ξ ∈
Ω[ψ] : φ ∈ Ξ}.
For any Γ ∈ Ω[ψ], there is a maximal consistent set Γ∞ in L such that Γ ⊆ Γ∞(Lemma
2.4). Note that such a maximally consistent extension might not be unique. Each such
Γ∞ determines a finitely additive probability measure on 〈Ω[ψ], 2Ω[ψ]〉. We define, for any
φ ∈ L[ψ],
αΓ
∞
φ = sup{r ∈ Q : Lrφ ∈ Γ
∞} and βΓ
∞
φ = inf{r ∈ Q :Mrφ ∈ Γ
∞}
Both αΓ
∞
φ and β
Γ∞
φ might be irrational.
Lemma 2.12. αΓ
∞
φ = β
Γ∞
φ .
Lemma 2.13. (1) 2Ω[ψ] = {[φ] : φ ∈ L[ψ]};
(2) For any φ1, φ2 ∈ L[ψ], ⊢Σ+ φ1 → φ2 iff [φ1] ⊆ [φ2].
We define Tψ(Γ) : 2
Ω[ψ] → [0, 1] by
Tψ(Γ)([φ]) = α
Γ∞
φ .
Such a defined function Tψ : 2
Ω[ψ] → [0, 1] is well-defined. From the first part of Lemma
2.13, it follows that Tψ(Γ) is total. It is easy to see that Tψ(Γ)(Ω[ψ]) = Tψ(Γ)([⊤]) = 1
since L1⊤ ∈ Γ
∞.
Theorem 2.14. For A,B ∈ 2Ω[ψ], if A∩B = ∅, then Tψ(Γ)(A)+Tψ(Γ)(B) = Tψ(Γ)(A∪B);
hence such a defined Tψ defines a probability measure on 〈Ω[ψ], 2
Ω[ψ]〉.
The following proposition is the crucial step to show the truth lemma. Also this is the
place where we really need the rule (ARCH).
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Theorem 2.15. For any Γ ∈ Ω[ψ], there is a maximally consistent extension Γ∞ in L of
Γ such that, for any formula φ ∈ L[ψ],
• if αΓφ = β
Γ
φ , then α
Γ∞
φ = α
Γ
φ;
• if αΓφ < β
Γ
φ , then α
Γ
φ < α
Γ∞
φ < β
Γ
φ ;
For each Γ ∈ Ω[ψ] and its such extension Γ∞, we define a type function on 〈Ω[ψ], 2Ω[ψ]〉:
Tψ(Γ)([φ]) := α
Γ∞
φ . It is easy to check that M [ψ] := 〈Ω[ψ], 2
Ω[ψ], Tψ〉 is a probability model.
We call it a canonical model for Σ+.
Lemma 2.16. (Truth Lemma) For any φ ∈ L[ψ] and Γ ∈ Ω[ψ],
M [ψ],Γ |= φ iff φ ∈ Γ.
Theorem 2.17. (Completeness) For any formula ψ, it is consistent (in Σ+) if and only if
it is satisfied in the class of type spaces.
3. Probability Logic ΣH for Harsanyi Type Spaces
In this section we will show that the axiom system Σ+ plus the following two axiom schemes:
• (4p) : Lrφ→ L1Lrφ
• (5p) : ¬Lrφ→ L1¬Lrφ
is sound and complete with respect to a special class of type spaces called Harsanyi type
spaces. Let ΣH denote this system and ⊢ΣH φ denote φ ∈ ΣH . Assume that 〈Ω,A, T 〉 is a
type space. [T (w)] denotes {w′ ∈ Ω : T (w) = T (w′)}. Note that [T (w)] is not necessarily
A-measurable. If each type is certain of its type, i.e.,
(H) : T (w)(E) = 1 for all w ∈ Ω and E such that [T (w)] ⊆ E ∈ A,
the type space is called a Harsanyi type space. If A is generated by a countable subalgebra
A0, then
[T (w)] =
⋂
A∈A0
{w′ ∈ Ω : T (w)(A) = T (w′)(A)}
=
⋂
A∈A0
⋂
r∈Q∩[0,1]
{w′ ∈ Ω : T (w′)(A) ≥ r ↔ T (w)(A) ≥ r}
=
⋂
A∈A0
⋂
r∈Q∩[0,1],T (w)(A)≥r
{w′ ∈ Ω : T (w′)(A) ≥ r}
and hence [T (w)] is A-measurable. With this countable subalgebra assumption, it is easy
to check that the condition (H) is equivalent to the following condition:
(H ′): For any w ∈ Ω and E ∈ A, T (w)({v ∈ Ω : T (v,E) 6= T (w,E)}) = 0,
which is the defining condition in [3] for Harsanyi type spaces.
In order to show the following properties of ΣH , we need to define normal forms for
probability formulas.
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Definition 3.1. Let Φ be a maximally consistent set of formulas in L(q, d, w), namely
an atom. A formula φ is called a statement in L(q, d, w) if it is of the form
∧
{pi : pi ∈
Φ} ∧
∧
{¬pi : ¬pi ∈ Φ} ∧
∧
{Lrφ : Lrφ ∈ Φ} ∧
∧
{¬Lrφ : ¬Lrφ ∈ Φ}. For the formula φ, its
first part
∧
{pi : pi ∈ Φ} ∧
∧
{¬pi : ¬pi ∈ Φ} is called the propositional part and its second
part
∧
{Lrφ : Lrφ ∈ Φ} ∧
∧
{¬Lrφ : ¬Lrφ ∈ Φ} is called the probability part.
For a statement φ in L(q, d, w), its propositional part and probability part are denoted
by φ=0 and φ>0, respectively.
Lemma 3.2. For any atom Γ ∈ Ω(q, d, w), the conjunction γ of all formulas in Γ is
tautologically equivalent to a statement in the language L(q, d, w), which is simply called
the statement of the atom Γ. The propositional (probability) part of the statement is simply
called the propositional (probability) part of the atom Γ. Moreover, any formula φ ∈
Φ(q, d, w) is tautologically equivalent to a disjunction of statements in L(q, d, w). This
disjunction is called a normal form of φ.
Proof. This proposition follows from the same argument for disjunctive normal forms in the
usual propositional reasoning.
Lemma 3.3. ⊢ΣH (Lrφ∧Lsψ)→ L1(Lrφ∧Lsψ), and ⊢ΣH (Lrφ∧¬Lsψ)→ L1(Lrφ∧¬Lsψ)
Proof. The proof of the second part is similar to that of the first one. We only show the
first part. Reason inside ΣH :
Lrφ ∧ Lsψ → L1Lrφ ∧ L1Lsψ (Axiom 4p)
→ L1(Lrφ ∧ Lsψ) (Corollary 2.9)
Corollary 3.4. For any statement φ, ⊢ΣH φ
>0 → L1(φ
>0).
3.1. Completeness. The following completeness theorem is based on the proof of the
completeness of Σ+ (Theorem 2.17):
Theorem 3.5. ΣH is sound and complete with respect to the class of Harsanyi type spaces.
The soundness of the system is clear. We concentrate on the completeness part. In Heifetz
and Mongin [19], they gave a proof sketch of the completeness proof. For the completeness
of our presentation, here we give a detailed proof whose style is different from that in [19].
Assume that ψ is consistent. We need to show that it is satisfiable in a Harsanyi type space.
Just as in the proof of the completeness of Σ+ (Theorem 2.17), we define a local language
L[ψ]. It gives rise to a set ΩH [ψ] which consists of all maximal ΣH -consistent sets, whose
elements are also called atoms in L[ψ] whenever no confusion arises.
Proof. Enumerate all the atoms in ΩH [ψ]:
Γ1,Γ2, · · · ,ΓN [ψ].
The conjunction of all formulas in each atom Γi ∈ ΩH [ψ] is denoted as γi. It has a normal
form or a statement γ=0i ∧φ
>0
i where γ
=0
i is the propositional part and γ
>0
i is the probability
part.
We divide the set of atoms in ΩH [ψ] into several groups (Gk)
K
k=1 according to their
probability parts:
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• all the atoms in each group have the same probability parts;
• atoms in different groups have different probability parts.
Next we define probability measures at all atoms according to their representatives at each
group. Pick up a representative Γik from each group Gk. We know from Theorem 2.15 that
Γik has a maximal consistent extension Γ
∞
ik
in L such that
• Γik ⊆ Γ
∞
ik
;
• For any formula φ ∈ L[ψ],
(1) if α
Γik
φ = β
Γik
φ , then α
Γ∞ik
φ = α
Γik
φ ;
(2) if α
Γik
φ < β
Γik
φ , then α
Γik
φ < α
Γ∞ik
φ < β
Γik
φ .
Let Tψ(Γik) be the probability measure on 〈ΩH [ψ], 2
ΩH [ψ]〉 according to Γ∞ik defined by
for any formula φ in L[ψ], Tψ(Γik)([φ]) = α
Γ∞ik
φ .
For each Γ ∈ Gk, define Tψ(Γ) := Tψ(Γik). That is to say, the probability measures
at atoms in each group Gk are defined to be the same as the probability measure at the
representative Γik . The canonical model in L[ψ] for ΣH isMH [ψ] := 〈ΩH [ψ], 2
ΩH [ψ], Tψ , Vψ〉
where Vψ(p) = [p] for any propositional letter p.
Claim 3.6. Tψ(Γik)(Gk) = 1
Observe that Gk = [γ
>0
ik
], the set of states in MH [ψ] containing γ
>0
ik
. Since Γ∞ik is a maximal
consistent extension of Γik and γ
ik
>0 → L1(γ
ik
>0) ∈ ΣH (Corollary 3.4), L1(γ
>0
ik
) ∈ Γ∞ik . So
Tψ(Γik)(Gk) = Tψ(Γik)([γ
>0
ik
]) = α
Γ∞ik
γ>0ik
= 1.
This implies that the above defined canonical model MH [ψ] is indeed based on a
Harsanyi type space.
Claim 3.7. For any formula φ in L[ψ] and any atom Ξ ∈ ΩH [ψ], MH [ψ],Ξ |= φ iff φ ∈ Ξ.
Equivalently, [φ] = [[φ]].
The proof of this claim is similar to that of Lemma 2.16 (or Lemma 3.17 in [38]). It
follows immediately that ψ is satisfiable in a Harsanyi type space.
Just as Ω(q, d, w) in last section about Σ+, ΩH(q, d, w) denotes the collection of max-
imally ΣH -consistent sets of formulas in L(q, d, w). MH(q, d, w) denotes the canonical
Harsanyi type on ΩH(q, d, w). In the remainder of this section, we will compute the cardi-
nality of this space.
3.2. Denesting Property and Unique Extension Theorem. First we show a denesting
property for ΣH , which says that each normal formula (which will be defined below) is
equivalent to a formula of depth ≤ 1. Next we prove a unique extension theorem in ΣH
that each maximally consistent set of formulas in a finite local language has only one
maximal consistent extension in this finite language extended by increasing the depth by 1.
Our denesting property and unique extension theorem demonstrate an important property
about the probability logic ΣH for Harsanyi type spaces which is parallel to but weaker than
the well-known denesting property in S5 that any formula in S5 is equivalent to a formula
of depth 1 (Appendix in [1]).
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Lemma 3.8. The proposition consists of four parts:
(1) ⊢ΣH Lsψ ∧ Lrφ→ Lr(φ ∧ Lsψ)
(2) ⊢ΣH Lsψ ∧ ¬Lrφ→ ¬Lr(φ ∧ Lsψ)
(3) ⊢ΣH ¬Lsψ ∧ Lrφ→ Lr(φ ∧ ¬Lsψ)
(4) ⊢ΣH ¬Lsψ ∧ ¬Lrφ→ ¬Lr(φ ∧ ¬Lsψ)
Proof. Reason inside ΣH :
Lrφ ∧ Lsψ → Lrφ ∧ L1(Lsψ)
→ Lr(φ ∧ Lsψ) (Corollary 2.9)
Similarly, other parts follow from Corollary 2.9.
Theorem 3.9. The proposition consists of two parts:
(1) ⊢ΣH (
∧m
i=1 Lsiψi ∧
∧n
j=1 ¬Ltjψ
′
j) ∧ Lrφ→ Lr(φ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 Lsiψi ∧
∧n
j=1 ¬Ltjψ
′
j))
(2) ⊢ΣH (
∧m
i=1 Lsiψi ∧
∧n
j=1 ¬Ltjψ
′
j) ∧ ¬Lrφ→ ¬Lr(φ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 Lsiψi ∧
∧n
j=1 ¬Ltjψ
′
j))
Proof. This proposition follows directly from the above lemma according to the following
fact:
⊢ΣH (
∧m
i=1 Lsiψi ∧
∧n
j=1 ¬Ltjψ
′
j)→ L1(
∧m
i=1 Lsiψi ∧
∧n
j=1 ¬Ltjψ
′
j)
Lemma 3.10. ⊢ΣH (Lrφ ∨ Lsψ)→ L1(Lrφ ∨ Lsψ)
Proof. Reason inside ΣH :
Lrφ → L1Lrφ
→ L1(Lrφ ∨ Lsψ)
Lsψ → L1(Lrφ ∨ Lsψ)
Lrφ ∨ Lsψ → L1(Lrφ ∨ Lsψ)
Theorem 3.11. If φ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Lrψ, then φ→ L1φ
is a theorem in ΣH .
Proof. Assume that φ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Lrγ and its dis-
junctive normal form is
∨I
i=1
∧ki
j=1 pi
i
jLrij
φij where pi
i
j is either blank or ¬. Reason inside
ΣH :
I∨
i=1
ki∧
j=1
piijLrij
φij →
I∨
i=1
L1(
ki∧
j=1
piijLrij
φij) (Corollary 3.3)
→ L1(
I∨
i=1
ki∧
j=1
piijLri
j
φij) (Lemma 3.10)
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Theorem 3.12. If φ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Lrψ, then, for any
r > 0, φ↔ Lrφ is a theorem in ΣH .
Proof. From the above theorem, it is easy to see that φ→ Lrφ is a theorem in ΣH . For the
other direction, we reason inside ΣH :
¬φ → L1¬φ (Theorem 3.11)
→ M0φ
→ ¬Lrφ
Theorem 3.13. If ψ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Lrψ
′, then, for any
r > 0 and any formula φ, (Lrφ ∧ ψ)↔ Lr(φ ∧ ψ) is a theorem in ΣH .
Proof. First we show
Lrφ ∧ ψ → Lrφ ∧ L1ψ (Theorem 3.11)
→ Lr(φ ∧ ψ) (Corollary 2.9)
For the other direction, we reason inside ΣH :
Lr(φ ∧ ψ) → Lrφ
→ Lrψ
→ ψ (Theorem 3.12)
Lr(φ ∧ ψ) → Lrφ ∧ ψ
Theorem 3.14. If ψ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Lrψ
′, then, for any
r > 0 and and formula φ, (Lrφ ∨ ψ)↔ Lr(φ ∨ ψ) is a theorem in ΣH.
Proof. First we show that (Lrφ∨ψ)→ Lr(φ∨ψ) is a theorem in ΣH . We reason inside ΣH
as follows:
Lrφ → Lr(φ ∨ ψ)
ψ → L1ψ (Theorem 3.11)
→ Lrψ
→ Lr(φ ∨ ψ)
Lrφ ∨ ψ → Lr(φ ∨ ψ)
For the other direction, we reason as follows:
¬ψ → L1¬ψ (Theorem 3.11)
→ M0ψ
¬Lrφ ∧ ¬ψ → ¬Lr(φ ∨ ψ) (Corollary 2.9)
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It follows from the above three denesting theorems that a certain kind of probability
formulas is equivalent to a formula of depth ≤ 1. A formula φ in the language L is called
normal if it is obtained inductively as follows
(1) any formula of depth ≤ 1 is normal;
(2) if Lr1φ1, · · · , Lrnφn are normal, then any Boolean combination of Lr1φ1, · · · , Lrnφn is
normal;
(3) if Lrφ(r > 0) is normal and ψ is a Boolean combination of normal formulas of the form
Lsψ
′(s > 0), then Lrψ, Lr(φ ∧ ψ) and Lr(φ ∨ ψ) are normal.
Corollary 3.15. Any normal formula is equivalent to a formula of depth ≤ 1 in ΣH .
However, we don’t have the following propositions in ΣH :
(1) Lr(φ1 ∧ φ2)↔ Lr1φ1 ∧ Lr2φ2
(2) Lr(φ1 ∨ φ2)↔ Lr1φ1 ∨ Lr2φ2
which correspond to the normality of the knowledge operator K : K(φ1 ∧ φ2) = K(φ1) ∧
K(φ2). Otherwise, with the above Theorems 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14, we would have been able
to show that that any formula is equivalent to a formula of depth ≤ 1. Despite this defect,
we will show Unique Extension Theorem which is similar to but weaker than the above two
properties.
In order to show the following Unique Extension Theorem, we prove a simple case as an
illustration. Recall that, for any formula φ in L(q, d, w) and any atom Γ ∈ ΩH(q, d+ 1, w),
αΓφ = max{r : Lrφ ∈ Γ} and β
Γ
φ = inf{r :Mrφ ∈ Γ}.
Lemma 3.16. Let Γ1,Γ2 and Γ3 be three different atoms in ΩH(q, d, w) and γ1, γ2 and γ3
be the equivalent statements of the conjunctions of formulas in these three atoms, respec-
tively. Their statements are γ=01 ∧ γ
>0
1 , γ
=0
2 ∧ γ
>0
2 and γ
=0
3 ∧ γ
>0
3 . Then the following three
propositions hold:
(1) if both γ>02 and γ
>0
3 are different from γ
>0
1 up to logical equivalence, then γ1 →M0(γ2∨
γ3) is provable in ΣH ;
(2) if only one of them, say, γ>02 , is different from γ
>0
1 up to logical equivalence, then
(a) γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) ∧MβΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) is provable in ΣH whenever α
Γ1
γ=0
3
= βΓ1
γ=0
3
;
(b) γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2∨γ3)∧¬MαΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2∨γ3)∧MβΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2∨γ3)∧¬LβΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2∨γ3) is provable
in ΣH whenever α
Γ1
γ=0
3
< βΓ1
γ=0
3
;
(3) if none of these two is different from γ>01 ,i.e., all of them are the same up to logical
equivalence, then
(a) γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) ∧ MβΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) is a theorem of ΣH whenever
αΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
= βΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
;
(b) γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2∨γ3)∧¬MαΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2∨γ3)∧MβΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2∨γ3)∧¬LβΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2∨
γ3) is a theorem of ΣH whenever α
Γ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
< βΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
;
In other words, the probability of the set {Γ2,Γ3} is syntactically uniquely determined at
the state Γ1 in the canonical model MH(q, d, w). Intuitively, Part 1 says that, if neither Γ2
nor Γ3 belongs to the same group as Γ1 (in terms of the proof of Theorem 3.5), then the
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probability measure at Γ1 should assign 0 to the event consisting of the two states Γ2 and
Γ3. Parts 2 and 3 can be explained in the same way.
Proof. Assume that both γ>02 and γ
>0
3 are different from γ
>0
1 . Reason inside ΣH :
γ1 → ¬γ
>0
2 (Γ1 and Γ2 are disjoint from each other)
→ L1(¬γ
>0
2 )
→ M0(γ
>0
2 )
γ1 → M0(γ
>0
3 )
γ1 → M0(γ
>0
2 ∨ γ
>0
3 )
γ1 → M0(γ2 ∨ γ3) (Proposition 2.7)
Next we assume that only one of them, say, γ>02 , is different from γ
>0
1 . From above, we
know that γ1 →M0γ2 is provable in ΣH .
γ1 → γ
>0
3
→ L1(γ
>0
3 ) (Corollary 2.9)
→ L
α
Γ1
γ=0
3
γ=03 (by definition of α
Γ1
γ=0
3
)
→ L
α
Γ1
γ=0
3
(γ=03 ∧ γ
>0
3 )
→ L
α
Γ1
γ=0
3
(γ3)
γ1 → M0γ2
γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) (Corollary 2.9)
γ1 → MβΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ3)
γ1 → M0γ2
γ1 → MβΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) (Corollary 2.9)
γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) ∧MβΓ1
γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3)
Assume that none of these two is different from φ1>0. Then γ
>0
1 = γ
>0
2 = γ
>0
3 . Reason inside
ΣH :
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γ1 → γ
>0
2
→ L1(γ
>0
2 )
γ1 → L1(γ
>0
2 )
γ1 → L1(γ
>0
3 )
→ L
α
Γ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ>02 ∧ (γ
=0
2 ∨ γ
=0
3 ))
γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
((γ>02 ∧ γ
=0
2 ) ∨ (γ
>0
3 ∧ γ
=0
3 ))
γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3)
γ1 → MβΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3)
γ1 → LαΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3) ∧MβΓ1
γ=0
2
∨γ=0
3
(γ2 ∨ γ3)
Theorem 3.17. (Unique Extension Theorem) Probabilities of formulas φ in the maximally
consistent extensions Γ(q, d, w) are uniquely determined by probabilities of their proposi-
tional parts φ=0 in the restrictions Γ(q, d, w) ∩ L(q, 1, w) within depth 1. Let Γ(q, d+ 1, w)
be a maximally consistent extension of Γ(q, d, w) ∈ Ω(q, d, w) by increasing its depth by 1
and the statement of the conjunction of all formulas in Γ(q, d, w) be γ=0 ∧ γ>0. Define
Γ(q, 1, w) := Γ(q, d, w)∩L(q, 1, w). Assume that φ is a formula in L(q, d, w) and its normal
form is the disjunction of the following statements:
φ=01 ∧ φ
>0
1 , φ
=0
2 ∧ φ
>0
2 , · · · , φ
=0
n ∧ φ
>0
n .
In addition, assume that the first m(≤ n) probability parts are the same as γ>0 and other
probability parts are different (up to logical equivalence), i.e.
φ>0i = γ
>0(1 ≤ i ≤ m) and φ>0j 6= γ
>0(m+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n)
Then α
Γ(q,d+1,w)
φ = α
Γ(q,1,w)
∨m
i=1 φ
=0
i
and β
Γ(q,d+1,w)
φ = β
Γ(q,1,w)
∨m
i=1 φ
=0
i
. That is to say, Γ(q, d, w) has one
and only one maximal consistent extension in ΩH(q, d+ 1, w), which is Γ(q, d+ 1, w).
Proof. This theorem is a straightforward generalization of the above Lemma 3.16.
It would be interesting to compare this unique extension theorem to the denesting
property in S5. The above theorem tells us that, in each maximally consistent set Γ of the
canonical models of any finite local language, the probability of any formula φ is uniquely
determined by the probabilities of formulas of depth 0 in the subset of Γ consisting of all
formulas of depth ≤ 1. So, it is similar to the denesting property in S5 that any formula in
S5 is equivalent to a formula of depth 1.
The following theorem tells us that the unique extension is actually determined by the
probability part.
Theorem 3.18. Assume that Γ1(q, d, w) and Γ2(q, d, w)(d ≥ 1) are two atoms in ΩH(q, d, w),
and Γ1(q, d+ k,w) and Γ2(q, d+ k,w) are maximal consistent extensions in ΩH(q, d+ k,w)
of Γ1(q, d, w) and Γ2(q, d, w), respectively, where k is a natural number. If the state-
ments of Γ1(q, d, w) and Γ2(q, d, w) have the same probability parts, then the statements
of Γ1(q, d+ k,w) and Γ2(q, d+ k,w) also have the same probability parts.
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Corollary 3.19. Any atom Γ(q, d, w) ∈ ΩH(q, d, w)(d ≥ 1) has one and only one maximal
consistent extension in ΩH(q, d+k,w) for any k ≥ 0. More precisely, it is the probability part
of the statement of Γ(q, d, w) that uniquely determines the probability part of its maximal
consistent extension in ΩH(q, d+ k,w).
3.3. Cardinality of the Canonical Model MH(q, d, w). In order to compute the cardi-
nality of the canonical modelMH(q, d, w), we first show a “conservation” result in the sense
that a formula of depth ≤ 1 provable in ΣH is also provable in Σ+.
Theorem 3.20. For any formula ψ of depth ≤ 1, ⊢ΣH ψ if and only if ⊢Σ+ ψ.
Proof. It suffices to show that, for any formula of depth 1, if it is consistent in Σ+,
then so is it in ΣH . Assume that ψ is a Σ+-consistent formula of depth 1. Then it
is contained in a maximal Σ+-consistent set Γ0(q(ψ), 1, w(ψ)) ∈ Ω(q(ψ), 1, w(ψ)). Re-
call that Ω(q(ψ), 1, w(ψ)) denotes the set of all maximal Σ+-consistent set of formulas in
L(q(ψ), 1, w(ψ)) and Γ0(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) denotes the set Γ0(q(ψ), 1, w(ψ)) ∩ L(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)),
which is the set of formulas of depth 0 in Γ0(q(ψ), 1, w(ψ)).
Now we define a Harsanyi type space on Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)). Consider Γ0(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)), which
is an element of Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)). We know from Theorem 2.15 that there is a probability
measure Tψ(Γ(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ))) at Γ(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)), which is defined through a maximal Σ+-
consistent extension Γ∞(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) in L, such that, for any formula φ ∈ L(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)),
(1) if α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,w(ψ))
φ = β
Γ0(q(ψ),1,w(ψ))
φ , then Tψ(Γ0(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)))([φ]) = α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,w(ψ))
φ
where, as usual, [φ] = {Ξ ∈ Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) : φ ∈ Ξ};
(2) if α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,w(ψ))
φ < β
Γ0(q(ψ),1,w(ψ))
φ , then α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,w(ψ))
φ < Tψ(Γ0(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)))([φ]) <
β
Γ0(q(ψ),1,w(ψ))
φ .
For other atoms Ξ ∈ Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)), define Tψ(Ξ) := Tψ (Γ0(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ))) and fur-
ther the canonical modelM(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) := 〈Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)), 2Ω(q(ψ),0,w(ψ)) , Tψ, V 〉 where
V (p) = [p](:= {Ξ ∈ Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) : p ∈ Ξ}). M(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) is a Harsanyi type
space. Indeed, for any atom Ξ ∈ Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)), [Tψ(Ξ)] = Ω(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) and hence
Tψ(Ξ)([Tψ(Ξ))]) = 1.
Claim 3.21. M(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)),Γ0(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) |= ψ.
It suffices to show that, for any formula φ in L(q(ψ), 1, d(ψ)),
M(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)),Γ0(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)) |= φ iff φ ∈ Γ0(q(ψ), 1, d(ψ)).
It is easy to check that this is true for the base case and the Boolean cases. The proof of
the nontrivial case: φ = Lrφ
′ is similar to that of Lemma 2.16. For completeness of the
presentation, we provide the proof details here.
Here we only prove the crucial case: φ = Lrφ
′. Assume that Γ0(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)) |=
Lrφ
′. According to our above definition of Γψ and induction hypothesis: [[φ
′]] = [φ′],
Tψ(Γ0(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)))([φ
′ ]) ≥ r. If α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ = β
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ , then Tψ(Γ0(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)))
([φ′]) = α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ ≥ r and Lrφ
′ ∈ Γ0(q(ψ), 1, d(ψ)). If α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ < β
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ ,
then α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ < Tψ(Γ0(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)))([φ
′ ]) < β
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ . Since r is a multiple
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of 1/qψ and β
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ = α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ + 1/qψ (Lemma 2.11), r ≤ α
Γ0(q(ψ),1,d(ψ))
φ′ and
hence Lr ∈ Γ0(q(ψ), 1, d(ψ)).
For the other direction, assume that Lrφ
′ ∈ Γ0(q(ψ), 1, d(ψ)). This implies that Lrφ
′ ∈
Γ∞(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)), which is a maximal consistent extension of Γ0(q(ψ), 1, d(ψ)) in L, and
Tψ(Γ0(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)))([φ]) = α
Γ∞
φ′ ≥ r by the definition of α
Γ∞
φ′ . According to the induction
hypothesis, M [ψ],Γ0(q(ψ), 0, d(ψ)) |= φ.
Since ψ ∈ Γ0(q(ψ), 1, w(ψ)), ψ is satisfied at Γ0(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)) in M(q(ψ), 0, w(ψ)).
According to the soundness for ΣH , ψ is ΣH -consistent.
⊤
✘✘✘✘✘✘✘✘✘✘✘✘✾
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✙
❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳③
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
Γ1(q, 1, w) Γ2(q, 1, w) ΓN−1(q, 1, w) ΓN (q, 1, w)
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
Γ1(q, 2, w) Γ2(q, 2, w) ΓN−1(q, 2, w) ΓN (q, 2, w)
...
...
...
...
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
Γ1(q, d, w) Γ2(q, d, w) ΓN−1(q, d, w) ΓN (q, d, w)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 1: maximal consistent extensions
The above figure illustrates the maximal consistent extensions in ΣH . The first step maximal
consistent extensions from ⊤ in ΣH are the same as those in Σ+ because the set of maximal
ΣH -consistent sets of formulas of depth ≤ 1 is the same as that of maximal Σ+-consistent
sets of formulas of depth ≤ 1. But after that, any atom has only one maximal consistent
extension, which is illustrated in the figure by demonstrating that each node from the second
step has only one descendant.
Theorem 3.22. If γ=0 is the propositional part of some atom Γ in ΩH(q, d, w) and δ
>0 is
the probability part of some atom Ξ in ΩH(q, d, w), then γ
=0∧ δ>0 is ΣH-consistent. In this
sense, the propositional part and the probability part are independent of each other.
Proof. Under the above assumption, let Ξ1 be the set of formulas in Ξ of the form Lrp or
¬Lrp where p is a propositional letter. First we show that {γ
=0}∪Ξ1 is ΣH -consistent. But
this follows directly from the same argument as in Claim 3.21 of the above Theorem 3.20.
It is easy to see that {γ=0} ∪ Ξ1 can be extended to a maximally ΣH -consistent atom
Γ1 ∈ ΩH(q, 1, w) and the statement of Γ1 is tautologically equivalent to the conjunction of
all formulas in {γ=0} ∪ Ξ1. According to the above Unique Extension Theorem, Γ1 has a
unique maximal consistent extension in ΩH(q, d, w) whose statement must be tautologically
equivalent to γ=0 ∧ δ>0. It follows that γ=0 ∧ δ>0 is ΣH -consistent.
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Example 3.23. Here we take as illustration the simplest case: q = 2, d = 1 and w = 1. That
is to say, there is only one propositional letter and we denote it by p. When depth =0, there
are only two maximally consistent sets of formulas: {p} and {¬p}. It is easy to see that if
we exclude propositional letters, there are totally 5 maximally consistent sets of formu-
las: {L0p,M0p}, {L0p,¬M0p,M1/2p,¬L1/2p}, {L1/2p,M1/2p}, {L1/2p,¬M1/2p,M1p,¬L1p}
and {L1p,M1p}.
By Theorem 3.22, we know that |ΩH(2, 1, 1)| = 10. According to the Unique Extension
Theorem, |ΩH(2, d, 1)| = 10 for all d ≥ 1.
From this example, it follows immediately that
Lemma 3.24. Let w = 1, i.e., the language has only one propositional letter. |ΩH(q, d, 1)| =
2(2q + 1) for all d ≥ 1.
Theorem 3.25. If the language has finitely many propositional letters, then |ΩH(q, d, w)|
is finite and |ΩH(q, d, w)| = |ΩH(q, d+ k,w)| for all d ≥ 1 and k ≥ 0.
Proof. If the language has finitely many propositional letters, i.e., w is finite, then there
are finitely many maximally consistent sets of formulas of depth 0 and hence finitely many
probability specifications of these maximal consistent sets in the finite language L(q, 1, w).
So, it follows from Theorem 3.22 that, up to logical equivalence, |ΩH(q, 1, w)| is determined
by the number of Boolean combinations of formulas of depth 0 and formulas of the form
Lrϕ where ϕ is a formula of depth 0, and hence is finite. By Theorem 3.17, we know that
|ΩH(q, d, w)| = |ΩH(q, d+ k,w)| for all d ≥ 1 and k ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.26. If the probability indices of the language L are restricted to a finite set of
rationals and the language has finitely many propositional letters, i.e., w is finite, then the
canonical space for ΣH is finite.
One may compare this theorem to a similar result in [1] for knowledge spaces obtained
through denesting in S5. In the remainder of this section, we apply the notion of bi-sequence
space in probability theory to the information structure in [17] and construct a continuum
of different Jr-lists (which will be defined shortly) which are all consistent. So, if the
probability indices of the language are restricted within a finite set of rationals, then the
canonical space of ΣH for at least two agents has the cardinality of the continuum.
3.4. Bi-sequence Space. Here we generalize the information structure in [17] to the type-
space setting through a notion called bi-sequence. Let Ωs be the set of all pairs of infinite
sequences of 0’s and 1’s with the same starting digit; that is,
Ωs = {(a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) : ak, bk ∈ {0, 1}∀k ≥ 0, a0 = b0}
For all k ≥ 0 let [ak = 1] be the set of states whose akth coordinate is 1. Define similarly
the sets [ak = 0], [bk = 0] and [bk = 1]. Note that [a0 = 0] = [b0 = 0] and [a0 = 1] = [b0 = 1].
Let Bs be the set {
⋂M
m=1[bkm = im] ∩
⋂N
n=1[aln = jn] : km, ln ≥ 0, im, jn ∈ {0, 1}}. In other
words, Bs is the collection of all finite intersections of the collection {[ak = 0], [ak = 1], [bk =
0], [bk = 1] : k ≥ 0}. Let As,0 be the collection of all finite unions of elements in Bs. It is
easy to check that As,0 is an algebra. Let As be the σ-algebra generated by As,0. As is
simply the product σ-algebra on {0, 1}N restricted to Ωs. Such defined measurable space
〈Ωs,As〉 is similar to sequence space (Section 2 in [4]), and is called a bi-sequence space.
Now we define an equivalence relation ∼1 as follows:
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(a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) ∼1 (a
′
0a
′
1a
′
2 · · · , b
′
0b
′
1b
′
2 · · · ) if, for all k ≥ 1, (ak = a
′
k), and
(ak = 1⇒ bk−1 = b
′
k−1).
Let Π1 be the partition of Ωs into equivalence classes of ∼1. Define ∼2 and Π2 analogously
by interchanging the roles of a′s and b′s. So, for any w = (a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) ∈ Ωs,
Π1(w) is the set of all states which is ∼1 -equivalent to w.
Definition 3.27. For any subset D of N and any subsequence ((ai)i≥1, (bj)j∈N\D), define
Ωs(((ci)i≥1, (dj)j∈N\D)) := {(a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) : ai = ci for all i ≥ 0, bj = dj for all j ∈
N \D} ∩ Ωs.
In other words, ((ai)i≥1, (bj)j∈N\D) is the subsequence which is shared by all elements in
Ωs(((ci)i≥1, (dj)j∈N\D)). A reduction mapping r1 from Ω((ci)i≥1, (dj)j∈N\D) to {(bk)k∈D :
bk ∈ {0, 1}} is defined by
r1 : (a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) 7→ (bk)k∈D.
It is easy to check that this function is one-to-one.
Example 3.28. Let w = (a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) where ak = 0 for all odd k and all other
coordinates are 1. Simply w = (101010 · · · , 11111 · · · ). Then
Π1(w) = {(a
′
0a
′
1a
′
2 · · · , b
′
0b
′
1b
′
2 · · · ) : ∀k ≥ 0(a
′
k = ak)&∀n ≥ 0(b2n = 1)}
So an element of Π1(w) looks like
(101010 · · · , 1b′11b
′
31b
′
5 · · · ) where b
′
1, b
′
3, b
′
5 ∈ {0, 1}.
There is an obvious one-to-one map between Π1(w) and its reduct r1(Π1(w)) := {(b
′
1b
′
3b
′
5 · · · b
′
2k+1 · · · ) :
k ≥ 0, b′2k+1 ∈ {0, 1}}:
(101010 · · · , 1b′11b
′
31b
′
5 · · · ) 7→ (b
′
1b
′
3b
′
5 · · · b
′
2k+1 · · · ).
Since r1(Π1(w)) has the cardinality of the continuum, and so does Π1(w).
For any w ∈ Ωs, Π1(w) is a subset of Ωs of the form Ωs((ai)i≥1, (bj)j∈N\D) for some
D ⊆ N. Moreover, r1(Π1(w)) = {(bk)k∈K : bk ∈ {0, 1}} is a special case of the well-known
sequence space.
Lemma 3.29. For any w = (a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) ∈ Ωs,
(1) Π1(w) is either finite or uncountable;
(2) Π1(w) ∈ As.
Proof. For any w = (a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) ∈ Ωs, Π1(w) is the intersection of countably
many events of [ak = i] or [bk = j] where k ≥ 0 and i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
(1) Let N0(w) := {k : the akth coordinate of w is 0}. It is easy to see that
• If N0(w) is countably infinite, then Π1(w) has the cardinality of the continuum.
• If N0(w) is finite, then Π1(w) is finite.
(2) Since Π1(w) is the countable intersection of events [ak = i] or [bk = j] in AS, Π1(w) is
AS-measurable.
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Example 3.30. (Sequence space) Let S = {0, 1}∞ be the space of all infinite sequences
w = (z0(w), z1(w), z2(w), · · · )
where zk is the k-th coordinate function mapping S to {0, 1}. A cylinder of rank n is a set
of the form
A = {w : (z0(w), z1(w), · · · , zn(w)) ∈ H)}
where H ⊆ {0, 1}n. Let C0 be the set of cylinders of all ranks. It is easy to check that C0 is
an algebra. Let p0 = 1/2 and p1 = 1/2. For a cylinder A given above, define
P (A) =
∑
H pu0pu1 · · · pun
the sum extending over all the sequences (u0, u1, · · · , un) in H.
Such a defined P is a probability measure on the algebra C0 and moreover it can be
uniquely extended to a probability measure on the σ-algebra C generated by C0. The
interested reader may refer to Section 2 in [4] for more details about sequence space.
In order to make the measurable space 〈Ωs,As〉 a Harsanyi type space, we will define
a type function on it in three steps:
• Step 1: for each state w and its equivalence class Π1(w) of the form Ωs((ai)i≥1, (bj)j∈N\D)
for some D ⊆ N, first we define a probability measure PΠ1(w) on its reduct r1(Π1(w)),
which is finite or a sequence space as in the above example.
• Step 2: according to the probability measure on r1(Π1(w)), we next derive a probability
measure Pr(Π1(w)) on the equivalence class Π1(w).
• Step 3: finally we define a type function T1 for agent 1 on the measurable space 〈Ωs,As〉
such that 〈Ωs,As, T1〉 is Harsanyi type space.
If D is finite, then Π1(w) is finite and we define the probability measure PΠ1(w) on the
measurable space 〈Π1(w), 2
Π1(w)〉 to be the uniform distribution on Π1(w). In other words,
for any w′ ∈ Π1(w), PΠ1(w)({w
′}) = 1|Π1(w)| .
If D has the cardinality of the continuum, then r1(Π1(w)) is a sequence space with a σ-
algebra CΠ1(w) and a probability measure Pr1(Π1(w)) as in the above Example 3.30. Since r1
is one to-one, it is easy to check that r−11 (CΠ1(w)) is a σ-algebra on Π1(w). From Pr1(Π1(w)) on
the sequence space r1(Π1(w)), we derive the probability measure PΠ1(w) on the measurable
space 〈Π1(w), r
−1
1 (CΠ1(w))〉 by
PΠ1(w)(A) := Pr1(Π1(w))(r1(A)) for any A ∈ r
−1
1 (CΠ1(w)).
So we have finished the first two steps. Now we start the third step by defining the
type function. For any w ∈ Ωs and E ∈ As, define
T1(w)(E) := PΠ1(w)(E ∩Π1(w))
It is easy to see that T1(w)(Π1(w)) = 1. In some sense, T1(w) is a probability measure on
〈Ωs,As〉 concentrating on the equivalence class Π1(w).
Proposition 3.31. Such a defined T1 is a type function on the measurable space 〈Ωs,As〉.
In order to show the proposition, we need to prove several lemmas. Recall that B≥r1 (E)
denotes the set {w ∈ Ωs : T1(w,E) ≥ r} and B
=r
1 (E) the set {w ∈ Ωs : T1(w,E) = r}. Let
αk and βk(k ∈ N) be the two coordinate functions from Ωs to {0, 1}:
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αk : ((ai)i∈N, (bj)j∈N) 7→ ak and βk : ((ai)i∈N, (bj)j∈N) 7→ bk.
Proposition 3.32. For any event E =
⋂M
m=1[bkm = im] ∩
⋂N
n=1[aln = jn](km, ln ≥
0, im, jn ∈ {0, 1}) ∈ Bs, B
≥r
1 (E) ∈ As for all r ∈ [0, 1], or equivalently, the function
T1(·, E) is As-measurable.
Proof. Here we take E = [b1 = 0] ∩ [a1 = 1] as an illustration. The proof of other cases is
similar. Given a state w ∈ Ωs, we divide the proof into the following cases:
• Case 1: α1(w) = 0. In this case T1(w,E) = 0
• Case 2: α1(w) = 1, α2(w) = 1 and β1(w) = 0. In this case, T1(w,E) = 1.
• Case 3: α1(w) = 1, α2(w) = 1 and β1(w) = 1. In this case, T1(w,E) = 0
• Case 4: α1(w) = 1, α2(w) = 0. In this case, T1(w,E) = 1/2.
So T1(·, E) is an As-measurable function.
Theorem 3.33. For any event E ∈ As,0, B
≥r
1 (E) ∈ As for all r ∈ [0, 1], or equivalently,
the function T (·, E) is As-measurable.
Proof. Given an event E ∈ As,0, we know that it is a finite disjoint union of events in Bs.
That is to say, E = ⊎ni=1Ei for some events Ei ∈ Bs(i = 1, · · · , n). It follows that, for any
w ∈ Ωs,
T1(w,E) =
∑n
i=1 T1(w,Ei)
Since all T1(·, Ei)’s are As-measurable, so is T1(·, E).
Proof of Proposition 3.31: In Theorem 3.33, we have shown that, for any E ∈ As,0,
T1(·, E) is an As-measurable function. By Lemma 2.2 , we know that, for any E ∈ As,
T1(·, E) is also an As-measurable function. So indeed T1 is a type function.
Theorem 3.34. 〈Ωs,As, T1〉 is a Harsanyi type space.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of T1.
Note that all the corresponding notions r2, T2 and B
≥r
2 for agent 2 can be defined dually
by interchanging the roles of a’s and b’s. And the corresponding propositions also hold for
agent 2.
3.5. Jr-lists. Let X be the event {(a0a1 · · · , b0b1 · · · ) ∈ Ωs : a0 = b0 = 1}. For agent i’s,
define two new operators J≥ri : As → As by
Jri E := (B
≥r
i E) ∪ (B
≥r
i ¬E)(i = 1, 2, r ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q)
Note that Jri E = J
r
i ¬E. Let s = (E1, E2, · · · , En) be a list of events. slast denotes the
last event En in the list and sinitial denotes the initial segment of s excluding the last event
slast.
Definition 3.35. For r ∈ [0, 1], a (finite)Jr-list is defined inductively as follows:
(1) (X) and (¬X) are Jr-lists;
(2) If s is a Jr-list and the operator of slast is J
r
1 or ¬J
r
1 , then (s, J
r
2slast) and (s,¬J
r
2slast)
are both Jr-lists;
(3) If s is a Jr-list and the operator of slast is J
r
2 or ¬J
r
2 , then (s, J
r
1slast) and (s,¬J
r
1slast)
are both Jr-lists;
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According to the definition (X) is a Jr-list. Applying both Jr1 and ¬J
r
2 to X, we have
(X,Jr1X), (X,¬J
r
2X)
Both of them are Jr-lists. Next adding ¬Jr2 and J
r
1 to the last events of the lists, respectively,
we have
(X,Jr1X,¬J
r
2J
r
1X), (X,¬J
r
2X,J
r
1¬J
r
2X).
Both of them are Jr-lists. We can go on, ad infinitum, generating infinitely many infinite
Jr-lists. It is easy to see that the set S∞ of infinite J
r-lists has the cardinality of the
continuum. A (finite or infinite) Jr-list is consistent1 if the intersection of all the events in
the list is nonempty.
Since Jri E = J
r
i ¬E for any event E, the above lists are also the same as
(X,Jr1X,¬J
r
2J
r
1X), (X,¬J
r
2X,J
r
1J
r
2X).
That is to say, we can omit all complementation signs inside an event. When r ≤ 1/2, the
event ¬Jri E = ¬B
≥r
i E ∩ ¬B
≥r
i ¬E is an empty set. This implies that when r ≤ 1/2, all
negated Jri -events are not consistent and hence not all J
r-lists are consistent.
However, when r > 1/2, Jri is called a “strongly believing whether” operator for agent
i and we show that all Jr-lists are consistent.
Lemma 3.36. Let r > 1/2. For all k ≥ 0,
• [ak = 1] = J
r
1J
r
2J
r
1 · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
X, [ak = 0] = ¬ J
r
1J
r
2J
r
1 · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
X
• [bk = 1] = J
r
2J
r
1J
r
2 · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
X, [bk = 0] = ¬ J
r
2J
r
1J
r
2 · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
X
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on k. When k = 0, it is easy to see that the lemma
holds by the definition of X. Note that [ak = 1] = ¬[ak = 0] and [bk = 1] = ¬[bk = 0]. For
k ≥ 1, it suffices to show the following inductive relations:
• [ak = 1] = J
r
1 [bk−1 = 1]
• [bk = 1] = J
r
2 [ak−1 = 1].
Here we prove the first equality. That is say, we show
[ak = 1] = (B
≥r
1 [bk−1 = 1]) ∪ (B
≥r
1 [bk−1 = 0])
Assume that w ∈ [ak = 1]. That is to say, αk(w) = 1. According to the definition of
∼1, the bk−1th coordinates of all elements in the equivalence class Π1(w) are the same as
βk−1(w), the bk−1th coordinate of w. It follows that Π1(w) ⊆ [bk−1 = βk−1(w)] and hence
T1(w, [bk−1 = βk−1(w)]) = 1. So w ∈ (B
≥r
1 [bk−1 = 1]) ∪ (B
≥r
1 [bk−1 = 0]).
Now we show the other inclusion. Assume that w 6∈ [ak = 1]. It follows that one half
elements in the equivalence class Π1(w) have 0 as their bk−1th coordinates and the other
half have 1 as their bk−1th coordinates. By the definition of T1, we know that
T1(w, [bk−1 = 0]) = 1/2 and T1(w, [bk−1 = 1]) = 1/2.
Therefore, w 6∈ (B≥r1 [bk−1 = 1]) and w 6∈ (B
≥r
1 [bk−1 = 0]). So w 6∈ ((B
≥r
1 [bk−1 = 1]) ∪
(B≥r1 [bk−1 = 0])). The second equality can be shown similarly. So we have proved the
lemma.
1This notion id different from the consistency of formulas that we define in Section 2.
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Theorem 3.37. For r > 1/2, all Jr-lists are consistent. In particular, all J1-lists are
consistent.
Proof. This theorem follows directly from the above lemma. Consider the Jr-list
(X,¬Jr2X,J
r
1J
r
2X,¬J
r
2J
r
1J
r
2X)
By the above lemma, X = [a0 = 1],¬J
r
2X = [b1 = 0], J
r
1J
r
2X = [a2 = 1], and ¬J
r
2J
r
1J
r
2X =
[b3 = 0]. That is to say, the intersection of all the events in this list is [a0 = 1]∩[b1 = 0]∩[a2 =
1] ∩ [b3 = 0]. So this J
r-list is consistent. From this example, we can easily generalize that
every infinite Jr-list is the intersection of {[ai = ki] : i ≥ 0} and {[bj = lj] : j ≥ 0}) for some
ki, lj ∈ {0, 1}, which includes the list (a0a1a2 · · · , b0b1b2 · · · ) as an element, and is hence
consistent.
Theorem 3.38. Assume that the probability indices of the language L are restricted within
a finite set of rationals. If further the language contains only one propositional letter p,
then the canonical space of ΣH for two agents has the cardinality of the continuum.
Proof. Assume that the probability indices of the language L are restricted within a finite
set of rationals and the language contains only one propositional letter p. If we replace
X in each J1-list by a proposition letter p and B≥ri by L
i
r, we obtain a list of formulas in
this restricted language which is satisfied in the Harsanyi type space 〈Ωs,As, Ti〉 by simply
interpreting them as follows:
• V (p) := X;
• for any formula φ in the restricted language, [[Lirφ]] := B
≥r
i [[φ]]
Consider the set S1∞ of infinite such J
1-lists of formulas starting with J11 operator or its
negation:
S1∞ = {(pi0p, pi1J
1
1 p, pi2J
1
2J
1
1p, · · · ) : pik is either blank or ¬ (k ≥ 0)}
It is easy to see that the set of formulas in each list in S1∞ is satisfied in the Harsanyi
type space 〈Ωs,As, (Ti)i=1,2〉 but the set of formulas in any two lists is not. Since S
1
∞ has
the cardinality of the continuum, so does the canonical space of ΣH for two agents.
Theorem 3.39. If the probability indices of the language L are restricted within a finite
set of rationals and there are finitely many propositional letters in the language, then the
canonical space ΩH of ΣH for n agents(2 ≤ n < ℵ0) has the cardinality of the continuum.
Proof. This proposition follows from the above theorem with the following two observations:
• ΩH has the an upper bound 2
ℵ0 , since the set of formulas in the restricted language is
countable and hence its power set has the cardinality of the continuum;
• the cardinality of the canonical space does not decrease with the increase of the number
of agents or of the number of the propositional letters.
The combination of Theorems 3.26 and 3.39 justifies the relative complexity of the multi-
agent interactive epistemology compared with one-agent epistemology from the perspective
of probabilistic belief.
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4. Relationship between knowledge and probabilistic beliefs
It is well-known in interactive epistemology [2, 3] that the concept of knowledge is implicit
in probabilistic beliefs in the above semantic framework. The logic for knowledge is the
well-known S5, which is the smallest normal modal logic plus the following axiom schema
[5]:
• (TK) Kip→ p
• (4K) Kip→ KiKip
• (5K) ¬Kip→ Ki¬Kip.
Recall that, given a Harsanyi type space 〈Ω,A, (Ti)i=1,2〉, for each state w ∈ Ω and agent i,
[Ti(w)] denotes the set of all states in which i
′s probabilities measures are the same as in w,
i.e., [Ti(w)] := {s
′ ∈ S : Ti(s
′)(A) = Ti(s)(A) for all A ∈ A }. [Ti(w)] induces a partition of
Ω and hence a knowledge operator Ki, which is an operator on A satisfying the well-known
S5 axioms. It is easy to check that Ki satisfies the following properties: for any E ∈ A,
(1) KiE ⊆ B
≥1
i E;
(2) B≥ri E ⊆ Ki(B
≥r
i E);
(3) (Ω \B≥ri E) ⊆ Ki(Ω \B
≥r
i E);
Let Πi be another partition and K
′
i be its associated knowledge operator satisfying the
above three properties. It is shown in [3] that, for each w ∈ Ω, [Ti(w)] = Πi(w).
However, syntactically knowledge is a separate and exogenous notion which is not re-
dundant. Indeed, the probability syntax can only express beliefs of the agents, not that an
agent knows anything about another one for sure. For the completeness of the presentation,
here we repeat the example in Section 8 in [3]. Let H and H ′ be two two-agent Harsanyi
type spaces. In H, there is only one state w, both Ann and Bob assign probability 1 to w.
In H ′, there are two states w and w′. At w, both Ann and Bob assign probability 1 to w;
at w′, Ann assigns probability 1 to w and Bob assigns probability 1 to w′. In addition, the
proposition letter p is true only at w in both spaces. It is easy to see that in H, Ann knows
for sure in w that Bob assigns probability 1 to p whereas she does not in H ′. Moreover, there
is no way to capture this syntactically without explicitly introducing knowledge operators
for Ann and Bob.
In the following, we give a new logical characterization of this relationship between prob-
abilistic belief and knowledge by generalizing the three notions of definability in multi-modal
logics [15, 14] to the setting of probabilistic beliefs and knowledge to show that this rela-
tionship is equivalent to the statement that knowledge is implicitly defined by probabilistic
belief, but is not reducible to it and hence is not explicitly definable in terms of probabilistic
belief. First we briefly review the background theory about definability in multi-modal logic
[15] and then apply it to the relationship between knowledge and probabilistic belief.
A language L((Oi)i∈N) is defined as follows. We start from a countable set of propo-
sitional letters AP := {p0, p1, · · · }. The set of formulas in the language L((Oi)i∈N) is
built from propositional letters by connectives ¬ and ∧, and the set of operators (Oi)i∈N.
Equivalently, a formula is defined according to the following syntax:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Oiφ(i ∈ N)
A logic Λ in the language L((Oi)i∈N) is a set of formulas that contains all propositional
tautologies, is closed under modus ponens and uniform substitution (that is, if φ ∈ Λ, do do
all its substitution instances.). Let Λ and Λ′ be two logics. Λ+Λ′ denotes the smallest logic
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containing Λ∪Λ′. Similarly, for a formula φ, Λ+φ denotes the smallest logic that contains
Λ ∪ {φ}. Let O′ be an operator new to Λ. Λ[Oi/O
′] is the logic obtained by replacing O′
for all occurrences Oi in all formulas in Λ.
Λ is normal if, in addition, for each operator Oi,
• KOi : Oi(φ→ ψ)→ (Oiφ→ Oiψ) ∈ Λ;
• it is closed under generalization: (φ ∈ Λ⇒ Oiφ ∈ Λ).
Note that we don’t require logics to be normal in this paper, since, obviously, probability
operators are not necessarily normal.
4.1. Algebras and Algebraic models. An algebra A for the language L((Oi)i∈N) is a
tuple
A := 〈B,¬,∧, 1, (Oi)i∈N〉
where 〈B,¬,∧, 1〉 is a Boolean algebra and Oi(i ∈ N) is a unary operator on B. An algebraic
model M based on this algebra A is a pair 〈A, v〉 where v is a valuation function from the
set AP of propositional letters to B. As usual, v can be extended to a meaning function
[[·]]M on all formulas inductively as follows:
• [[p]]M = v(p) for all proposition letters;
• [[φ ∧ ψ]]M = [[φ]]M ∧M [[ψ]]M;
• [[¬φ]]M = ¬M[[φ]]M;
• [[Oiφ]]M = Oi([[φ]]M).
We omit the subscript M if no confusion arises. A formula φ is valid in M if [[φ]] = 1
and is valid in the underlying algebra A if φ is valid in all algebraic models based on A. It
is valid in a class of algebras if it is valid in all algebras in this class. Let Th(M) be the
set of all formulas which are valid in M and Th(A) be the set of formulas which are valid
in A. A logic Λ is sound with respect toM (A) if Λ ⊆ Th(M)(Th(A)); also we say, A(M)
is a Λ-algebra (an algebraic model for Λ). And it is complete with respect to M (A) if we
reverse the above inclusion, i.e., Λ ⊇ Th(M)(Th(A)).
For a logic Λ in the language L((Oi)i∈N), we define an equivalence relation ≡Λ on
formulas by φ ≡Λ ψ if φ ↔ ψ ∈ Λ. |φ|Λ denotes the equivalence class that contains φ.
Let L((Oi)i∈N)/≡Λ be the collection of all equivalent classes. The corresponding algebraic
operations are defined as follows:
• ¬|φ|Λ = |¬φ|Λ
• |φ|Λ ∧ |ψ|Λ = |φ ∧ ψ|Λ
• Oi(|φ|Λ) = |Oiφ|Λ
It is easy to check that these operations are well-defined and such defined AΛ :=
〈L((Oi)i∈N)/≡Λ, ¬,∧, (Oi)i∈N〉 is an algebra. We call it the Lindenbaum algebra for the
logic Λ. The canonical algebraic model MΛ is a tuple:
〈L((Oi)i∈N)/≡Λ,¬,∧, (Oi)i∈N, vΛ〉
where 〈L((Oi)i∈N)/≡Λ,¬,∧, (Oi)i∈N〉 is the Lindenbaum algebra for Λ and vΛ is the canon-
ical valuation: vΛ(p) = |p|Λ.
Proposition 4.1. A logic Λ in the language L((Oi)i∈N) is sound and complete with respect
to {MΛ} and hence with respect to {AΛ}. Therefore, it is sound and complete with respect
to the class of Λ-algebras.
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Proof. The interested reader may refer to Chapter 5 in [5] for details.
4.2. Three Notions of Definability. Let δ be a formula in the language L((Oi)i∈N). O∞
is new to L((Oi)i∈N). We call the following formula a definition of O∞ in terms of operators
(Oi)i∈N
DO∞ : O∞p↔ δ,
which is a formula in L((Oi)i∈N, O∞). Let Λ be a logic in L((Oi)i∈N, O∞). For a smaller
language L′ ⊆ L, if Λ′ = Λ ∩ L′, we say Λ is a conservative extension of Λ′. Λ0 denotes
Λ ∩ L((Oi)i∈N), which is a logic. If A = 〈B,¬,∧, 1, (Oi)i∈N, O∞〉 is a Λ-algebra, then it is
easy to show that 〈B,¬,∧, 1, (Oi)i∈N〉 is a Λ0-algebra, which is denoted A0. So A is also
written as 〈A0, O∞〉.
Definition 4.2. O∞ is explicitly defined in Λ if there is a definition DO∞ such that DO∞ ∈
Λ. O∞ is implicitly defined in Λ if O∞p ↔ O
′
∞p ∈ Λ + Λ[O∞/O
′
∞]. O∞ is reducible to
(Oi)i∈N if there is a definition of O∞ in terms of (Oi)i∈N such that Λ0+DO∞ is a conservation
extension of Λ0 and Λ ⊆ Λ0 +DO∞.
An algebra O of unary operators over a Boolean algebra 〈B,¬,∧, 1〉 is a Boolean algebra
which is closed under composition where operations on operators are defined as follows:
• for any f ∈ O, (¬f)(x) := ¬f(x);
• for any f, g ∈ O, (f ∧ g)(x) := f(x) ∧ g(x);
• for any f, g ∈ O, (f ◦ g)(x) := f(g(x));
• 1 is a constant operator which maps each element in B to 1.
For a Λ-algebra A = 〈B,¬,∧, 1, (Oi)i∈N, O∞〉, the algebra O
∗
A of operators over A is the
smallest algebra that includes (Oi)i∈N and O∞. Such a defined 〈O
∗
A,¬,∧, ◦, 1O∗A〉 is called an
algebra of operators on A. O∗A0 can be defined similarly for the associated reduced algebra
A0.
The following three propositions are the algebraic characterizations of these three no-
tions of definability.
Proposition 4.3. O∞ is implicitly defined in Λ if and only if, for any two Λ-algebras
〈A0, O∞〉 and 〈A0, O
′
∞〉, O∞ = O
′
∞.
Proposition 4.4. O∞ is explicitly defined in Λ if and only if for each Λ-algebra A, O
∗
A =
O∗A0 .
Proposition 4.5. O∞ is reducible to (Oi)i∈N in Λ if and only if each Λ0-algebra A0 can
be extended to a Λ-algebra A such that O∗A = O
∗
A0
.
Proposition 4.6. O∞ is explicitly defined in Λ if and only if O∞ is implicitly defined and
is reducible to (Oi)i∈N in Λ.
The proofs of the above 4 propositions are similar to the corresponding lemmas in
[15, 14]: the left-to-right directions are shown by the meaning functions on algebraic models
and the right-to-left ones are proved through canonical models. The interested reader may
refer to these papers for detailed proofs. It is worth noting that the proofs in [15, 14] for
modal operators also apply to our probability operators Lr in this paper.
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4.3. Definability of knowledge in terms of probabilistic belief. We have finished the
review of the background theory about definability in multi-modal logic. Now we apply it
to the relationship between knowledge and probabilistic belief. In this section, the language
L in previous sections are written as L((Lr)r∈[0,1]∩Q) in order to make explicit the operators
(Lr)r∈[0,1]∩Q. Let LHK be the language L((Lr)r∈[0,1]∩Q,K). In the remainder of this section,
we mainly consider the logic ΣHK := (ΣH + (S5)K + {H1,H2,H3}) ⊆ L((Lr)r∈[0,1]∩Q,K),
where the operators Lr(r ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q) satisfy the logic ΣH , and K satisfies the well-known
S5 axioms and these operators are connected by the following 3 axioms:
• (H1) : Lrφ→ KLrφ;
• (H2) : ¬Lrφ→ K¬Lrφ;
• (H3) : Kφ→ L1φ.
Definition 4.7. A knowledge-belief space is a tuple 〈Ω,A, T,Π〉 where
• 〈Ω,A, T 〉 is a Harsanyi type space;
• 〈Ω,Π〉 is a knowledge space where Π is a partition on Ω;
• For each w ∈ Ω and E ∈ A, Π(w) ⊆ E implies T (w)(E) = 1;
• For each w ∈ Ω and E ∈ A, [T (w)] ⊆ E implies Π(w) ⊆ E.
Theorem 4.8. The logic ΣHK is sound and complete with respect to the class of knowledge-
belief spaces.
Proof. The interested reader may refer to the detailed proofs in [10, 2, 37].
Theorem 4.9. K is implicitly defined in the logic ΣHK .
Proof. Let A1 = 〈B,¬,∧, 1, (B
≥r)r∈[0,1]∩Q,K1〉 and A2 = 〈B,¬,∧, 1, (B
≥r)r∈[0,1]∩Q,K2〉 be
two ΣHK-algebras, where B
≥r is the corresponding semantical interpretation of Lr, and K1
and K2 are the corresponding interpretations of the syntactical K in LHK . It is easy to
check that the following equalities hold:
• For any e ∈ B, B=1(K1e) = K1e;
• For any e ∈ B, B=1(K2e) = K2e;
• For any e ∈ B,K1(B
=1e) = B=1e;
• For any e ∈ B,K2(B
=1e) = B=1e;
Since K1e = B
=1K1e,
K2(K1e) = K2(B
=1(K1e))
= B=1(K1e)
= K1e
Since K1e ≤ e, K2(K1e) ≤ K2e. So K1e ≤ K2e. Similarly, we can show that K2e ≤ K1e.
So K1e = K2e. That is to say, K1 = K2.
The following example is adapted from Example 5.3 in [15].
Example 4.10. Let W = [0, 1],B = {B ⊆ [0, 1] : B is a Borel set in [0, 1] and λ(B) = 0 or
1 }, and U = {B ⊆ [0, 1] : B is a Borel set in [0, 1] and λ(B) = 1} where λ is the Lebesgue
measure. It is easy to check that B is an algebra under the set complementation and the set
intersection. In some sense we can say that U is the set of all “big” events in [0, 1]. Define
the probability operators (B=r)r∈[0,1]∩Q as follows:
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B=rE =


E ∪ {0} if E ∈ U and r = 1
∅ if E ∈ U and 0 < r < 1
Ec \ {0} if E ∈ U and r = 0
E \ {0} if E 6∈ U and r = 1
∅ if E 6∈ U and 0 < r < 1
Ec ∪ {0} if E 6∈ U and r = 0
It is easy to check that B=r(r ∈ [0, 1]∩Q) indeed define probability operators B≥r(r ∈
[0, 1] ∩ Q) on the algebra B. Note that, if 0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ 1, then B≥rE ⊇ B≥sE for any
E ∈ B.
Lemma 4.11. The above defined algebra A = 〈B,¬,∩,W, (B≥r)r∈[0,1]∩Q〉 is a ΣH-algebra
that can not be extended to a ΣHK-algebra.
The tedious verification of this lemma is relegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 4.12. K can not be reduced to (Lr)r∈[0,1]∩Q in the logic ΣHK ; therefore it cannot
be explicitly defined in this logic.
Proof. This theorem follows directly from the above Lemma 4.11, Propositions 4.5 and 4.6.
Theorem 4.13. Every Harsanyi type space 〈Ω,A, T 〉 can be extended to a knowledge-belief
system 〈Ω,A, T,Π〉.
Proof. Given a Harsanyi type space 〈Ω,A, T 〉, we can define a partition on Ω: for each
w ∈ Ω,
Π(w) := [T (w)]
In other words, the equivalence class containing w is the set of all states whose probability
measure is the same as that in w. It is easy to check that 〈Ω,A, T,Π〉 is a knowledge-belief
system.
Corollary 4.14. The logic ΣHK is a conservative extension of ΣH .
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 2.17, Theorem 4.8 and the above conserva-
tion theorem 4.13.
5. Related works and Conclusions
It is interesting to note the similarity of our axiomatization Σ+ in [38] to the list of properties
about semantic belief operators B≥r in the Introduction. Despite the similarity, our proof
of the completeness of Σ+ [37, 38] is in keeping with the Kripke-style proof of completeness
in modal logic [5], and is quite different from Samet’s analytical argument in [34] about
semantical operators B≥r. Our axiomatization is in the spirit of modal and coalgebraic logic
[32]. As in ordinary modal logic, our language is finitary in the sense that we allow only for
finite conjunctions and disjunctions. So it may look strange to show weak completeness by
including such an infinitary rule as (ARCH). But this strangeness can be explained away in
our completeness proof which is given through a probabilistic version of standard filtration
method in modal logic [37]. In this method, the crucial step is to define a probability
measure at each state in the finite canonical model for a given consistent formula φ. In
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order to achieve this, we extend every maximally consistent set of formulas by decreasing
the granularity of rational indices in the language for filtration. This extension is possible
only by including (ARCH). This is due to the Archimedean property for probability indices
in the language. Moreover, one may apply Proposition 3.2 in [19] to show the necessity of
(ARCH) for the weak completeness of Σ+. Since all of our contributions in the paper are
related to weak completeness and have nothing to do with strong completeness, we decide
not to discuss strong completeness here. One may refer to [25, 26, 41, 28, 40] for details
about this topic. Also it may be interesting to note the close relation of our Archimedean
rule to the approximation of Markov processes [8, 41, 6].
Our above system is motivated by the work by Fagin et.al. in [11, 10] and more directly
the work by Heifetz and Mongin in [19]. However, our approach to completeness [37, 38]
differs from theirs in that we don’t use any arithmetic formulas like reasoning about linear
inequalities in [10] or any arithmetic style rule like the following rule (B) in [19]. Let
(φ1, · · · , φm) be a finite sequence of formulas and φ
(k) denote
∨
1≤i1<···<ik≤n
(φi1 ∧ · · · ∧ φik).∧m
k=1(φ
(k) ↔ ψ(k)) is denoted as (φ1, · · · , φm) ↔ (ψ1, · · · , φm). The inference rule (B) can
be stated as follows:
(B) :
((φ1, · · · , φm)↔ (ψ1, · · · , ψm))
((
∧m
i=1 Lriφi) ∧ (
∧m
j=2Msjψj))→ L(r1+···+rm)−(s2+···+sm)ψ1
,
for (r1 + · · ·+ rm)− (s2 + · · ·+ sm) ∈ [0, 1].
In this paper we have shown some important properties for probability logic for Harsanyi
type spaces. First, we present an axiomatization ΣH for the class of Harsanyi type spaces,
which is different from those in the literature in our infinitary Archimedean rule (ARCH),
and employ a probabilistic version of filtration method to show its completeness. By using
the same method, we show both a denesting property and a unique extension theorem for
ΣH . Moreover, we apply these properties to show that the canonical model of ΣH for a
single agent in a finite local language is finite. In contrast, we prove by demonstrating
a continuum of different Jr-lists through a special Harsanyi type space called bi-sequence
space that, for at least 2 agents, the canonical space has the continuum of different states.
The difference between the cardinalities of these canonical spaces illustrates the relative
complexity of multi-agent interactive epistemology compared with the one-single-agent epis-
temology from the perspective of probabilistic beliefs. Aumann’s knowledge-belief systems
are Harsanyi type spaces with an appropriate knowledge operator. Finally we formulate
the relationship between knowledge and probabilistic beliefs in Aumann’s knowledge-belief
systems by generalizing the three notions of definability in multi-modal logic [15].
Our logical characterization of the relationship between knowledge and probabilistic
beliefs is motivated by Aumann’s knowledge-belief systems in [2]. Aumann has constructed
a canonical knowledge-belief space, that is, a knowledge-belief space which contains all
maximally ΣHK-consistent sets of formulas in the language LHK . His construction of the
canonical model inspired Heifetz and Samet’s work showing the existence of a universal
(Harsanyi) type space without any topological assumptions [21]. Following a similar line,
Meier proved the existence of a universal knowledge-belief structures under the condition
that the knowledge operators of the agents in a knowledge-belief space operate only on
measurable subsets of the space [29]. Not every knowledge-operator is induced by a partition
[35]. So knowledge as an operator is related to but different from knowledge induced by a
partition. This difference can be explained by the two different semantics in modal logic:
algebraic semantics vs frame-based semantics [5]. Actually, the above three notions of
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definability in multi-modal logics are characterized in algebraic semantics not in frame-based
semantics as in Aumann’s original formulation of knowledge-belief systems. In the present
context, a pressing problem is to understand in knowledge-belief systems the relationship
of knowledge as operator and knowledge induced by a partition in order to characterize the
interaction between knowledge-hierarchy [20] and belief hierarchy [21] in these systems. We
also expect to apply our logic for Harsanyi type spaces to analyze finite depth of reasoning
and equilibrium in games with incomplete information [23].
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Appendix: Some Proofs
Proof. (Proof of Lemma 2.2) Our proof here is adapted from the Crucial Lemma 4.5 in [21].
It is easy to see that (2)⇒ (1). Now we show the other direction. Let F0 be the σ-algebra
generated by the set {B≥r(E) : E ∈ A0, r ∈ [0, 1]} and F be the σ-algebra generated by
the set {B≥r(E) : E ∈ A, r ∈ [0, 1]}. In order to show this lemma, it suffices to prove
that F0 = F . Indeed, for E ∈ A, if F = F0, B
≥r(E) ∈ F0. On the other hand, (1)
implies that F0 ⊆ A. So it follows that B
≥r(E) ∈ A and hence (2) is proved. Define
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A′ = {E ∈ A : B≥r(E) ∈ F0 for all r}. It is easy to see that A0 ⊆ A
′. According to
Halmos’ monotone class theorem, in order to show that F ⊆ F0, it suffices to show that A
′
is a monotone class. Indeed, if we show that A′ is a monotone class, then the σ-algebra A
generated by A0 is also a subset of A
′, which implies that F ⊆ F0.
Claim 5.1. If (En)
∞
n=1 be a decreasing sequence of events in A
′, then
⋂∞
n=1En ∈ A
′.
Proof of the claim: For each w ∈ Ω, since T (w, ·) is a probability measure , T (w,En)
converges to T (w,
⋂∞
n=1En). This implies the following equality:
{w ∈ Ω : T (w,
⋂∞
n=1En) ≥ r} =
⋂∞
n=1{w ∈ Ω : T (w,En) ≥ r}
Simply, B≥r(
⋂∞
n=1En) =
⋂∞
n=1B
≥r(En) ∈ F0. It follows that
⋂∞
n=1En ∈ A
′.
Claim 5.2. If (En)
∞
n=1 be a increasing sequence of events in A
′, then
⋃∞
n=1En ∈ A
′.
Proof of the claim: For each w ∈ Ω, since T (w, ·) is a probability measure , T (w,En)
converges to T (w,
⋃∞
n=1En). This implies the following equality:
{w ∈ Ω : T (w,
⋃∞
n=1En) ≥ r} =
⋂∞
m=1
⋃∞
n=1{w ∈ Ω : T (w,En) ≥ r − 1/m}
Simply, B≥r(
⋃∞
n=1En) =
⋂∞
m=1
⋃∞
n=1B
≥r−1/m(En) ∈ F0. It follows that
⋃∞
n=1En ∈
A′.
So we have shown the lemma.
Proof. (Proof of Lemma 4.11) First we show that A is a ΣH algebra.
(1) (A1) For any E ∈ B, B≥0E =W .
(2) (A2) B≥rW =W for all r ∈ [0, 1].
(3) (A3) We divide this case into several subcases:
• Case 1: E1 ∈ U and E2 ∈ U . Assume that r, s > 0. In this case, E1 ∩ E2 ∈ U , E1 ∩
¬E2 6∈ U , hence B
≥r(E1∩E2) = (E1∩E2)∪{0}, B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) = (E1∩¬E2)\{0} and
B≥r+s(E1) = E1 ∪ {0}. Obviously B
≥r(E1 ∩E2)∩B
≥s(E1 ∩¬E2) = ∅ ⊆ E1 ∪ {0} =
B≥r+s(E1). When r = 0( s = 0), B
≥r(E1∩E2) =W (B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) =W ). Definitely,
we have B≥s(E1 ∩ ¬E2) ⊆ B
≥r+s(E1)(B
≥r(E1 ∩E2) ⊆ B
≥r+s(E1)).
• Case 2: E1 ∈ U and E2 6∈ U . The proof of this case is similar to that of the above
case.
• Case 3: E1 6∈ U and E2 ∈ U . Assume that r > 0 and s > 0. In this case, E1 ∩ E2 6∈
U , E1∩¬E2 6∈ U , hence B
≥r(E1∩E2) = (E1∩E2)\{0}, B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) = (E1∩¬E2)\
{0} and B≥r+s(E1) = E1 \ {0}. Obviously B
≥r(E1 ∩ E2) ∩ B
≥s(E1 ∩ ¬E2) = ∅ ⊆
E1\{0} = B
≥r+s(E1). When r = 0( s = 0), B
≥r(E1∩E2) =W (B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) =W ).
Definitely, we have B≥s(E1 ∩ ¬E2) ⊆ B
≥r+s(E1)(B
≥r(E1 ∩ E2) ⊆ B
≥r+s(E1)).
• Case 4: E1 6∈ U and E2 6∈ U . The proof of this case is similar to that in Case 3.
(4) (A4) Similarly we divide the proof into the following several cases:
• Case 1: E1 ∈ U and E2 ∈ U . Assume that r, s > 0. In this case, E1 ∩ E2 ∈
U , E1 ∩¬E2 6∈ U , hence ¬B
≥r(E1 ∩E2) = ¬[(E1 ∩E2)∪{0}] = [(¬E1)∪ (¬E2)] \ {0},
¬B≥s(E1 ∩ ¬E2) = ¬[(E1 ∩ ¬E2) \ {0}] = (¬E1) ∪ E2 ∪ {0} and ¬B
≥r+s(E1) =
¬[E1∪{0}] = (¬E1)\{0}. Obviously ¬B
≥r(E1∩E2)∩¬B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) = (¬E1)\{0} =
B≥r+s(E1). When r = 0( s = 0), B
≥r(E1∩E2) =W (B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) =W ). Definitely,
we have ¬B≥r(E1 ∩ ¬E2) = ∅ ⊆ B
≥r+s(E1)(¬B
≥s(E1 ∩ E2) ⊆ ¬B
≥r+s(E1)).
• Case 2: E1 ∈ U and E2 6∈ U . The proof of this case is similar to that of the above
case.
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• Case 3: E1 6∈ U and E2 ∈ U . Assume that r, s > 0. In this case, E1 ∩ E2 6∈
U , E1 ∩¬E2 6∈ U , hence ¬B
≥r(E1 ∩E2) = ¬[(E1 ∩E2) \ {0}] = [(¬E1)∪ (¬E2)]∪{0},
¬B≥s(E1 ∩ ¬E2) = ¬[(E1 ∩ ¬E2) \ {0}] = (¬E1) ∪ E2 ∪ {0} and ¬B
≥r+s(E1) =
¬[E1\{0}] = (¬E1)∪{0}. Obviously ¬B
≥r(E1∩E2)∩¬B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) = (¬E1)∪{0} =
B≥r+s(E1). When r = 0( s = 0), B
≥r(E1∩E2) =W (B
≥s(E1∩¬E2) =W ).Definitely,
we have ¬B≥r(E1 ∩ ¬E2) = ∅ ⊆ B
≥r+s(E1)(¬B
≥s(E1 ∩ E2) ⊆ ¬B
≥r+s(E1)).
• Case 4: E1 6∈ U and E2 6∈ U . The proof of this case is similar to that in Case 3.
(5) (A5) We divide the proof into the following subcases:
• Case 1: E ∈ U . Assume that r + s > 1. Since 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 1, r > 0 and s > 0. It
follows that B≥rE = E ∪ {0} and ¬B≥s(¬E) = ¬((¬E) \ {0}). Obviously, B≥rE =
E ∪ {0} ⊆ ¬(B≥s(¬E)).
• Case 2: E 6∈ U . Assume that r + s > 1. Since 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 1, r > 0 and s > 0. It
follows that B≥rE = E \ {0} and ¬B≥s(¬E) = ¬((¬E) ∪ {0}). Obviously, B≥rE =
E \ {0} ⊆ ¬(B≥s(¬E)).
(6) (DIS) Assume that E1 ⊆ E2. It follows directly that B
≥rE1 ⊆ B
≥rE2.
(7) (ARCH) Assume that E ⊆ B≥s(E′) for all s < r. Obviously r > 0 and hence r/2 > 0.
Since 0 < r/2 < r, B≥r(E′) = B≥r/2(E′). It follows that E ⊆ B≥r(E′).
(8) (H1) We divide the proof of this case into the following 3 subcases:
• Case 1: r = 0. In this case, it is obvious that B≥r(E) =W = B≥1(B≥r(E)).
• Case 2: r > 0 and E ∈ U . It follows that B≥r(E) = E ∪ {0} = B≥1(B≥r(E)).
• Case 3: r > 0 and E 6∈ U . It follows that B≥r(E) = E \ {0} = B≥1(B≥r(E)).
(9) (H2) We divide the proof of this case into the following 3 subcases:
• Case 1: r = 0. In this case, it is obvious that ¬B≥r(E) = ∅ = B≥1(¬B≥r(E)).
• Case 2: r > 0 and E ∈ U . It follows that ¬B≥r(E) = ¬E \ {0} = B≥1(¬B≥r(E)).
• Case 3: r > 0 and E 6∈ U . It follows that ¬B≥r(E) = ¬E ∪ {0} = B≥1(¬B≥r(E)).
Finally we have shown all the cases and hence have show that A is indeed a ΣH -algebra.
Now we show that it can not be extended to a ΣHK-algebra. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose that it were. It is easy to check that the following propositions hold.
• For any event E ∈ U and 0 ∈ E, K(E) = B=1E = E;
• For any event E 6∈ U and 0 6∈ E, K(E) = B=1E = E;
• For any event E ∈ U and 0 6∈ E, K(E) = E ( B=1(E) = E ∪ {0};
• For any event E 6∈ U and 0 ∈ E, K(E) = B=1E = E \ {0}.
Note that, for any event E, B=1(K(E)) = K(E). For any event E3 such that E3 ∈ U and
0 6∈ E3,
B=1E3 = B
=1(K(E3)) = K(E3)
But this contradicts the fact that B=1E3 6= K(E3). So we have shown the second part of
this lemma.
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